{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-verifiable-agent-credential-whose-subject-binding-is-cryptographically-valid-but-whose-delegation-chai",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance reject a verifiable agent credential whose subject binding is cryptographically valid but whose delegation chain contains a non-monotonic capability widening",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "This record applies to AAIF credential validation at the point of admission, specifically when an agent presents a verifiable credential (VC) whose subject DID matches the presenter, whose signature verifies against the issuer's DID document, and whose delegation chain is structurally intact—but where a downstream link in the chain asserts a capability set that is not a subset of its parent link's capability set. It does not apply to credential revocation checks (handled by status list resolution), to DID document key rotation races (handled by resolution-time binding), or to first-party credentials with no delegation chain.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-verifiable-agent-credential-whose-subject-binding-is-cryptographically-valid-but-whose-delegation-chai.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-verifiable-agent-credential-whose-subject-binding-is-cryptographically-valid-but-whose-delegation-chai.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-verifiable-agent-credential-whose-subject-binding-is-cryptographically-valid-but-whose-delegation-chai.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1277,
    "python_slice_tokens": 164,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The critical distinction is between **signature validity** and **authorization monotonicity**. A credential can be perfectly signed, correctly bound to the presenter's DID, and structurally well-formed—and still be an authorization violation. The AAIF validation pipeline treats these as separate gates: cryptographic verification (does the signature hold?) an...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a multi-agent orchestration run, a coordinator agent (DID `did:aaif:coord-7f3a`) issued a delegation credential to a worker agent scoped to `repo:read, repo:write:branch=feature/*`. The worker, in turn, delegated to a sub-worker with scope `repo:write:branch=*` and `repo:admin:protected`. The sub-worker's credential verified cleanly: the issuer signature checked out against the worker's DID document, the subje...",
    "condition_of_validity": "Reject the credential if and only if all of the following hold: 1. The credential's proof verifies against the issuer's resolved DID document (i.e., cryptographic validity is *established*, not assumed). 2. The `credentialSubject.delegationChain` is present and has length ≥ 2 (a genuine multi-hop chain). 3. For at least one adjacent pair `(parent, child)` in...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary between \"admit\" and \"reject\" is not \"does the signature verify\" but \"is the chain capability-monotonic under structural subset.\" Two failure modes sit on either side: - **False admit (the observed failure):** Treating signature validity as sufficient. This is the default in naive verifiers and is the source of privilege escalation across agent m...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing monotonic containment at admission converts a silent privilege-escalation class into an explicit, auditable rejection. The operational cost is that verifiers must resolve the full delegation chain (not just the terminal credential) and must carry a capability algebra capable of structural subsumption. Chains with unresolvable intermediate scopes be..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "8a2b7a7f4438c67ff697bd2e2cb334cc388eb018ae3216989f7bbab13964540e",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityWideningError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_is_subset",
      "validate_delegation_chain"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityWideningError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "proof did not verify; cannot assess chain",
      "parent scope unresolvable; defer, do not admit"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
