{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-signed-skill-manifest-whose-signature-validates-but-whose-declared-capability-set-is-a-superset-of-wha",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance reject a signed skill manifest whose signature validates but whose declared capability set is a superset of what the signer was authorized to grant",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to dynamically loaded agent skill/tool registries that verify manifests via detached signatures over a canonicalized manifest body, where the *signer identity* and the *granted capability set* are established by separate authorities. Does not apply to single-authority registries where the signer is also the capability authority, nor to manifests whose capabilities are derived deterministically from the signer's role at load time.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-signed-skill-manifest-whose-signature-validates-but-whose-declared-capability-set-is-a-superset-of-wha.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-signed-skill-manifest-whose-signature-validates-but-whose-declared-capability-set-is-a-superset-of-wha.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-signed-skill-manifest-whose-signature-validates-but-whose-declared-capability-set-is-a-superset-of-wha.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1590,
    "python_slice_tokens": 245,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not signature forgery and not manifest tampering. It is **authorization scope confusion**: a manifest signature attests *who produced the manifest*, but registries routinely treat it as attesting *what the producer is permitted to declare*. When the signer is a valid, trusted publisher — a compromised but legitimate signing key, a delegat...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across three independent agent platforms we observed the same pattern in registry load paths: 1. **Canonicalization drift.** Manifests were signed over a canonical JSON form (sorted keys, no whitespace) but parsed into a runtime object that applied default-merging: an omitted `capabilities` field defaulted to `[\"*\"]` for \"legacy compatibility.\" The signature validated over the *signed* body (no capabilities key); the...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The rejection rule `capabilities(manifest) ⊄ grant_scope(signer) ⇒ reject` is *valid and must be enforced* precisely when all of the following hold: - The registry accepts manifests from more than one signer identity, or from delegated signers. - The trust root is broader than any individual signer's authority (i.e., signing authority and capability authorit...",
    "decision_boundary": "At manifest load, in order: 1. Verify the detached signature over the **exact canonical bytes** that will be parsed. Do not re-serialize between verify and parse; pin the canonicalizer and hash the parsed structure back to confirm identity. 2. Resolve `signer_identity` from the verified key, following the delegation chain if present. 3. Walk the delegation c...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the scope-narrowing invariant converts the skill-injection surface from \"any valid signature suffices\" to \"the signer must have been authorized for exactly what it declares.\" This eliminates the legacy-default and delegation-widening vectors entirely, because both produce manifests whose declared set exceeds the signer's grant and are rejected at s..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "431db34c953052d46def61c202dcfac6f94c8fcaaf0cbe1f27aa660f19529839",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityScopeViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "load_manifest"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 6,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityScopeViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "parsed capabilities diverge from signed body"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
