{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-agent-capability-whose-attenuation-chain-is-valid-but-whose-revocation-horizon-is-shorter-th",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance reject a delegated agent capability whose attenuation chain is valid but whose revocation horizon is shorter than the delegation depth",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to any agent runtime that accepts capability tokens carrying an attenuation chain (a sequence of delegated, monotonically-narrowed scopes) and a per-hop revocation horizon (a TTL or epoch bound after which the delegator's authority is considered withdrawn unless re-attested). Does not apply to single-hop bearer tokens with no delegation, nor to systems where revocation is pushed synchronously to every verifier before the next request.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-agent-capability-whose-attenuation-chain-is-valid-but-whose-revocation-horizon-is-shorter-th.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-agent-capability-whose-attenuation-chain-is-valid-but-whose-revocation-horizon-is-shorter-th.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-agent-capability-whose-attenuation-chain-is-valid-but-whose-revocation-horizon-is-shorter-th.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1439,
    "python_slice_tokens": 240,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is this: **attenuation validity and revocation liveness are independent invariants that are frequently conflated because both are expressed as \"the chain checks out.\"** A chain can be perfectly attenuated — every hop is a strict subset of its parent, signatures verify, the principal root is trusted — and still be *dead on arrival* be...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-hop delegation (`orchestrator → planner → executor`) where each hop was granted a 60-second horizon and the executor's task was a 4-minute fan-out across 40 sub-tools, the executor accepted the token at t=0 (chain valid, scope attenuated correctly to the sub-tool allowlist), began issuing calls, and at t=60 the planner's horizon lapsed. The executor's *own* horizon was still live (it had been minted at t=0...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A delegated capability is operationally valid at time *t* for a task of expected duration *D* if and only if: 1. **Attenuation monotonicity holds** for all hops: `scope[i] ⊆ scope[i-1]`, and the root principal is trusted at *t*. 2. **Revocation liveness holds at admission**: `horizon[i] > t` for all *i* in the chain. 3. **Revocation liveness holds through co...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is a comparison, not a boolean chain check. Concretely: - If `min_i(horizon[i]) - t ≤ D`, **reject** with a `RevocationHorizonInsufficient` error and surface the deficit (`min_horizon - t - D`) so the caller can re-mint. - If `min_i(horizon[i]) - t > D + ε`, **accept** and proceed. - If the task duration *D* is unknown or unbounded (open-ended a...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing condition 3 converts a class of silent partial-execution failures into loud admission-time rejections. The operational consequences are: - **Compensating transactions become unnecessary** for horizon-induced failures, because no side effects were produced. - **Delegation depth becomes a cost**: each hop that shortens the horizon narrows the maximum..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a3d64c1c8034e166ea8ea982b1b2175e1fc462b82baaf9b538eaaa75bc86c853",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationHorizonInsufficient",
      "Hop"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "admit_delegation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "RevocationHorizonInsufficient"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty delegation chain"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
