{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-downstream-aaif-credential-when-the-upstream-chain-contains-a-re-delegation-hop-whose-scope-wa",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance refuse to mint a downstream AAIF credential when the upstream chain contains a re-delegation hop whose scope was narrowed by an unverifiable policy reference",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF credential chaining (v1.2 and later) where an agent instance mints a delegated credential from an upstream token carrying a `scope_narrowing` claim that cites an external policy reference. Does not apply to single-hop direct delegation, to chains where every hop's narrowing is expressed inline as a concrete scope set, or to opaque-token deployments without introspectable chain metadata.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-downstream-aaif-credential-when-the-upstream-chain-contains-a-re-delegation-hop-whose-scope-wa.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-downstream-aaif-credential-when-the-upstream-chain-contains-a-re-delegation-hop-whose-scope-wa.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-downstream-aaif-credential-when-the-upstream-chain-contains-a-re-delegation-hop-whose-scope-wa.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1822,
    "python_slice_tokens": 369,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"the upstream credential is invalid\" and not \"the downstream request exceeds the delegated scope.\" Both of those are detectable by ordinary signature verification and scope-set intersection. The boundary condition is subtler: the upstream credential is cryptographically valid, its scope claim is syntactically well-formed, and the requested...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-hop chain (human → orchestrator agent → worker agent → sub-worker), the orchestrator narrowed its delegated authority via a policy reference `aaif:policy:tenant-4471:data-classification@sha256:9f3c…`. The worker agent's AAIF runtime verified the orchestrator's signature, parsed the `scope_narrowing` claim, and — because the policy reference was syntactically valid and matched the expected URI grammar — tre...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds — an instance *may* safely mint downstream from a policy-narrowed scope — only when at least one of the following is true: - The policy reference is **resolvable and evaluable** by the minting instance, and re-evaluation reproduces the upstream scope set exactly (not merely a superset). - The upstream credential carries a **signed scope d...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary is precise: **the moment the minting instance cannot distinguish \"scope narrowed correctly\" from \"scope narrowed by a policy I cannot see,\" it must stop.** The trigger is not the presence of a policy reference — it is the conjunction of (a) a `scope_narrowing` claim whose authority derives from a reference, (b) the reference being unres...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing this boundary changes chain behavior in three observable ways. First, chains with dangling or stale policy references **fail at the hop that cannot resolve them**, not at the eventual point of misuse — the blast radius shrinks from \"unauthorized action performed\" to \"delegation refused.\" Second, deployments are pushed toward one of two clean design..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "5e47530e3b11b275d4f30b45b3cd3791a03349004f50e428c4c7f5c346fcbd93",
    "verified_classes": [
      "UnverifiableNarrowingError",
      "ScopeNarrowing",
      "MintContext"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "assert_mintable",
      "mint_downstream"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "UnverifiableNarrowingError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "no freshness bound configured for policy references; stale-snapshot risk is unbounded",
      "requested scope exceeds stated upstream scope"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
