{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-on-quorum-overlap-alone-in-multi-agent-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-coordination",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance refuse to commit on quorum overlap alone in multi-agent Byzantine consensus for shared-state coordination",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to leader-based replicated state machines (PBFT-style or HotStuff-style) coordinating shared agent state where up to `f` of `3f+1` peers are Byzantine and the safety argument rests on quorum intersection. Does not apply to crash-fault-only systems, to systems with attested hardware or trusted execution, or to single-writer append-only logs with no cross-quorum state handoff.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-on-quorum-overlap-alone-in-multi-agent-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-coordination.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-on-quorum-overlap-alone-in-multi-agent-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-coordination.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-on-quorum-overlap-alone-in-multi-agent-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-coordination.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters operationally is between **quorum intersection as a set-theoretic guarantee** and **quorum intersection as a safety proof for a specific decision**. In a `3f+1` system, any two quorums of size `2f+1` intersect in at least `f+1` replicas, of which at least one is honest. This guarantees that *some* honest replica has seen both quo...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a coordinated shared-state update across a 7-replica cluster (`f=2`, quorum `5`), a network partition split the cluster `5/2`. The majority side committed value `W` at view 12 with certificate `C_W` containing signatures from replicas `{r0,r1,r2,r3,r4}`. Replica `r3` had acknowledged its prepare to the leader at view 12 within 4ms of receiving it, but its WAL fsync completed 180ms later; the leader counted the...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The quorum-intersection safety argument is valid for a given commit certificate **if and only if** every signature in the certificate was produced by a replica whose vote was grounded in state that survived a crash-recovery cycle prior to the signature being emitted. Concretely, all of the following must hold: 1. **Durable-before-ack:** every replica fsyncs ...",
    "decision_boundary": "An instance must **refuse to commit** — must raise and halt rather than accept the certificate — when any of the following holds, even if the certificate is cryptographically valid and the quorum count is met: - The certificate contains a signature from a replica whose last-known durable high-water mark is strictly less than the certificate's view (stale-sig...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that commit latency is bounded below by the slowest fsync in the quorum, not by the slowest network round-trip. In the observed cluster this raised p99 commit latency from 12ms to 190ms — a 16× regression that is the *correct* cost of safety. Implementations that optimize this away by counting bare votes reintroduce the failure a..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "609d1542728627ca3fbe029d9532ac5158db03e19c4a23b7467e649b313fb82d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "QuorumSafetyError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_commit_certificate"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "QuorumSafetyError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
