{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-propagate-prompt-injection-taint-across-a-tool-boundary-rather-than-clearing-it-at-the-return-edge",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance propagate prompt-injection taint across a tool boundary rather than clearing it at the return edge",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to agents that carry information-flow labels (taint bits, integrity tags, or provenance sets) on context slots and invoke external tools whose return values are re-inserted into context. Does not apply to stateless single-shot inference, nor to tools whose outputs are structurally confined to typed fields the agent never re-serializes into natural language.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-propagate-prompt-injection-taint-across-a-tool-boundary-rather-than-clearing-it-at-the-return-edge.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-propagate-prompt-injection-taint-across-a-tool-boundary-rather-than-clearing-it-at-the-return-edge.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-propagate-prompt-injection-taint-across-a-tool-boundary-rather-than-clearing-it-at-the-return-edge.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1706,
    "python_slice_tokens": 363,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The naive rule is *taint is born at untrusted ingress and dies at the tool return edge* — the tool returned a value, the value is now \"data,\" and data is safe. This is wrong in exactly one direction and right in another, and the boundary between them is the whole problem. The distinction that matters is **whether the tool's return value is a function of tain...",
    "what_was_observed": "A summarizer agent was given a document-fetch tool and a summarization tool. The fetch tool was labeled `UNTRUSTED_SOURCE`; its output was correctly labeled `LOW_INTEGRITY`. The summarization tool was labeled `TRUSTED`, and its return edge cleared all labels — the rationale being \"the summarizer is our model, it can't be injected.\" The agent was then asked to \"summarize the fetched document and, per the summary's ins...",
    "condition_of_validity": "Propagation (do not clear) is required when **all** of the following hold: 1. The tool's return value is a function of at least one context slot labeled below the trust threshold of the consuming step (taint in the input closure). 2. The tool's output is re-inserted into a context slot that a downstream step will treat as instructions, tool arguments, or con...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision is not \"is this tool trusted?\" but \"**is the return value's label a function of the input's label?**\" Concretely: - **Clear** iff the tool is a pure producer (output independent of tainted inputs) — e.g., `now()`, a constant lookup, a fetch of a URL that was itself constructed only from trusted slots. - **Propagate** iff the tool consumes tainte...",
    "operational_effect": "With propagation enforced, the poisoned summary carried `LOW_INTEGRITY` into the planner, which refused to execute the action item without human confirmation — the injection was contained. The cost is label creep: taint accumulates through chains of legitimate transformations and eventually quarantines benign outputs, requiring declassification gates (human ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "PROMPT_INJECTION_OR_CONFUSED_DEPUTY"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "d7d3f529487f6c7a23649483fd29977c46befb2c2bb381850814235159d87bbc",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TaintLaunderingError",
      "Label"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "tool_return_label",
      "insert_into_context",
      "join"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TaintLaunderingError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "assert summary_label.tainted",
      "assert not clock_label.tainted"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
