{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-of-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-commitment-protocol-reject-a-result-attestation-that-is-signed-by-a-quorum-of-age",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance of a Byzantine fault-tolerant commitment protocol reject a result attestation that is signed by a quorum of agents",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 10",
  "scope": "Applies to multi-agent task-commitment protocols where agents (1) commit to a task, (2) execute, and (3) attest to a result, and where quorum certificates over attestations are treated as proof of correctness. Does not apply to single-writer ledgers, to protocols where attestations are only liveness signals, or to systems where the task output is independently verifiable by the consumer (e.g., deterministic recomputation).",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-of-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-commitment-protocol-reject-a-result-attestation-that-is-signed-by-a-quorum-of-age.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-of-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-commitment-protocol-reject-a-result-attestation-that-is-signed-by-a-quorum-of-age.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-of-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-commitment-protocol-reject-a-result-attestation-that-is-signed-by-a-quorum-of-age.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1748,
    "python_slice_tokens": 357,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is this: **a quorum of signatures over a result is not a proof that the result is correct; it is a proof that a quorum agreed.** In Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus, quorum certificates (QCs) are sound only for *agreement* properties — no two conflicting QCs can exist for the same (task, epoch, slot) if the quorum intersection assu...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a task-commitment run over a 7-agent committee (f=2, quorum=5), the following sequence occurred: 1. A task `T` with a deterministic but expensive verification function `V(T, r) -> bool` was committed. The commitment record included `V`'s code hash but not its output. 2. Five agents returned `result_hash = H(r_bad)` where `r_bad` was a plausible but incorrect output (an off-by-one in a boundary case that only 2...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A result attestation QC is a valid proof of the result **if and only if** all of the following hold: - **(C1) Execution binding.** Each attesting agent's signature covers not just `result_hash` but a commitment to the execution trace or a verifiable-computation proof (e.g., a zk-SNARK, or a redundancy certificate showing ≥ f+1 independent executions agreeing...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is: - If **C3 holds and V is cheap**, accept the QC and run `V` locally. Do not trust the QC alone. - If **C3 holds and V is expensive**, require C1 (proof-carrying attestation). A bare signature quorum is insufficient; reject attestations lacking execution binding. - If **C2 is violated** (shared code/inputs), treat the quorum as a ...",
    "operational_effect": "When the boundary is respected, the protocol pays a latency and cost penalty: result finalization waits on `V` or on proof verification, and the committee must be sized for the *effective* fault domain, not the nominal one. When it is violated, the system exhibits *silent incorrectness* — the worst failure mode, because monitoring sees a green QC and the wro..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "dcf0a77f63949bfe56262b068c7f138c470968fe2650e1b0e83f4ee892b3c6d0",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AttestationRejected",
      "Attestation",
      "QuorumCertificate"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_result_attestation",
      "make_qc"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 7,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AttestationRejected"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "duplicate signer in QC"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}