{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-defer-quorum-derived-action-commitment-when-the-commitment-certificate-s-witness-set-is-intersection-valid-but",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance defer quorum-derived action commitment when the commitment certificate's witness set is intersection-valid but causally stale",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "This record applies to agent swarms executing consensus-gated actions (Raft/PBFT-style or BFT-SMaRt-derived commitment) where an action is triggered by a quorum certificate (QC) over a proposal hash, and where agents may be partitioned, restarted, or subject to equivocation. It does not apply to single-leader crash-fault-tolerant pipelines without signature aggregation, nor to systems where action commitment is gated on local log durability rather than witness-set quorum.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-defer-quorum-derived-action-commitment-when-the-commitment-certificate-s-witness-set-is-intersection-valid-but.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-defer-quorum-derived-action-commitment-when-the-commitment-certificate-s-witness-set-is-intersection-valid-but.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-defer-quorum-derived-action-commitment-when-the-commitment-certificate-s-witness-set-is-intersection-valid-but.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1551,
    "python_slice_tokens": 199,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The invariant that is commonly assumed — and that is subtly false — is: *\"If a commitment certificate carries a witness set whose members constitute a valid quorum under the configured threshold, the action it references is safe to execute.\"* The genuine invariant is weaker and conditional: a witness set is **intersection-valid** if it meets the threshold ar...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a 47-minute partition of a 7-node swarm (`f=2`, threshold `5`), nodes `{A,B,C}` remained on the majority side and committed action `alpha` at view `v=12`, producing QC-12 with witnesses `{A,B,C,D,E}`. Nodes `{F,G}` were on the minority side, stalled at view `v=11`. After partition heal, a delayed gossip replay delivered a stale proposal for action `beta` — a conflicting action at view `v=11` — accompanied by a...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A quorum-derived action commitment is safe to execute only when the following conjunction holds: 1. **Witness validity:** the witness set meets the configured threshold and each signature verifies against the witness's registered key for the claimed view. 2. **Intersection validity:** the witness set intersects every other certificate the executor might late...",
    "decision_boundary": "The executor must choose between two failure modes, and the choice is not free: - **Defer-on-stale (safety-preserving):** reject any QC whose `view` is `<= max_committed_view` observed by the executor, and additionally reject any QC whose witness set contains a member that has since attested a higher committed view. This preserves action-layer safety at the ...",
    "operational_effect": "After the incident, the swarm's action layer was amended to carry a per-witness `committed_view` attestation in every signature payload, and the executor was changed to require `min(witness.committed_view) >= view(QC) - delta` before execution. Certificates failing this check are quarantined, not dropped, and re-submitted to the consensus log for ordering. T..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "c002aba348223985ba12b6b3e342f4766155f4332bc94d7679a1eca8902c782a",
    "verified_classes": [
      "StaleCommitmentError",
      "Witness",
      "QuorumCertificate"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "commit_action"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "StaleCommitmentError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
