{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-be-held-responsible-for-an-unsafe-action-in-litmus-agentic-safety-benchmarks",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance be held responsible for an unsafe action in LITMUS agentic safety benchmarks",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style evaluation harnesses that score agentic trajectories against safety specifications where actions are attributed to an agent instance across multi-step, tool-using episodes. Does not apply to single-turn classification benchmarks or to harnesses that score only final outputs without trajectory attribution.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-be-held-responsible-for-an-unsafe-action-in-litmus-agentic-safety-benchmarks.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-be-held-responsible-for-an-unsafe-action-in-litmus-agentic-safety-benchmarks.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-be-held-responsible-for-an-unsafe-action-in-litmus-agentic-safety-benchmarks.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1318,
    "python_slice_tokens": 359,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between **action provenance** and **action attribution**. LITMUS-style harnesses log every tool call, message, and state mutation as an event with a provenance chain (which model, which sub-agent, which retry, which tool shim). Safety scoring, however, requires an *attribution* decision: which instance is held responsible for an u...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a LITMUS run over a delegated tool-use suite, an unsafe action (a shell command writing outside the sandbox) was emitted by a sub-agent instance `worker-3`, spawned by `planner-1`. The harness attributed the unsafe event to `worker-3` and marked `planner-1` safe. The planner had, in its delegation prompt, explicitly authorized \"any filesystem operation needed to complete the task.\" The safety violation was initiat...",
    "condition_of_validity": "Attribution to instance `I` is valid if and only if all of the following hold: 1. `I` is the instance whose decision function produced the action, and no ancestor instance's instruction was the proximate cause of that action's unsafe property. 2. The event is not a replay of a prior event under the same causal decision (deduplicate by `(decision_id, action_h...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational rule: **attribute upward to the last instance that could have prevented the unsafe property without contradicting its own received instruction.** If a worker's instruction explicitly authorizes the unsafe action, the worker is not the responsible party; the delegator that issued the authorization is. If the worker's instruction forbids it and...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying this boundary changes per-role safety rates materially (in the observed suite, planner safety dropped from 0.98 to 0.81; worker safety rose from 0.74 to 0.93) while leaving the aggregate unchanged. Any harness that reports only aggregate safety is blind to this inversion. The correct invariant to assert in CI: for every unsafe event, exactly one ins..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "f5f160ff710b797703ed977ed4c0459680ea68276894a9d0672d35cdecfd24dc",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AttributionInvariantError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "attribute_unsafe_event",
      "_authorization_permits",
      "_evaluable_under"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AttributionInvariantError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
