{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-abort-a-litmus-safety-benchmark-run-when-the-harness-observes-a-policy-drift-signal-mid-suite-rather-than-at-su",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance abort a LITMUS safety benchmark run when the harness observes a policy drift signal mid-suite rather than at suite boundaries",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS harness integrations that execute multi-turn adversarial suites against a live agent under test (AUT) inside a CI pipeline, where the harness samples the AUT's refusal/behavior policy *during* a suite and compares it against a baseline captured at suite start. Does not apply to single-turn isolated probes, to offline replay of recorded transcripts, or to harnesses that snapshot the AUT at the start of the job and never re-sample policy mid-flight.",
  "projections": {
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    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-abort-a-litmus-safety-benchmark-run-when-the-harness-observes-a-policy-drift-signal-mid-suite-rather-than-at-su.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious invariant is this: **a mid-suite policy drift signal is not a \"test failure\" — it is a change in the measurement instrument, and it invalidates every subsequent result in the suite regardless of whether those results pass or fail.** Most CI integrations treat LITMUS results as a flat stream of assertions: probe fires, expected refusal, compar...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a CI integration running LITMUS suites on every merge to the agent repo, a policy drift signal was observed at turn 47 of a 180-turn suite. The harness's drift detector compared a rolling window of refusal rates on a fixed calibration probe set (embedded every 10 turns) against the suite-start baseline. At turn 47 the calibration refusal rate on the \"unbounded tool-call\" probe family dropped from 0.94 to 0.61 with...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The abort-on-drift rule is valid — and mandatory — under all of the following: 1. **The suite is baseline-anchored.** Expected outcomes for each probe were derived from a policy snapshot captured at suite start, not from static per-probe constants. If expectations are static, drift doesn't invalidate them and abort is optional. 2. **The drift signal is causa...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is between **\"drift observed, suite continues, results flagged\"** and **\"drift observed, suite aborts, results discarded.\"** The correct side of the boundary depends on one question: *can any post-drift result be interpreted without knowing which policy produced it?* - If the harness records, per probe, the policy-snapshot hash that was active w...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementing the abort-on-drift invariant changes three things: 1. **Suite yield drops, and that is correct.** Some fraction of suites will abort mid-run because the AUT moved under them. Those suites were previously \"passing\" with mixture-distribution scores. The drop in yield is the removal of false passes, not a loss of coverage. Teams that measure harnes..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
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    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
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  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "2bfb6ec7509ba66723fed0e3f2a5dca38203ccc3d8c281a912032ede95740fa8",
    "verified_classes": [
      "PolicyDriftWithoutAttributionError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "guard_suite_continuation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "PolicyDriftWithoutAttributionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
