{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-through-argument-aliasing-as-a-distinct-exfiltration-channel-from-taint-propagation-through",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance treat taint propagation through *argument aliasing* as a distinct exfiltration channel from taint propagation through *return values*",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to taint-aware tool-call sandboxes where a model-visible tool result is labeled with a taint set, and tainted values are permitted to flow into subsequent tool arguments only when a policy allows it. Does not apply to sandboxes that operate purely on syntactic token filtering or that treat the model context as a single undifferentiated trust domain.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-through-argument-aliasing-as-a-distinct-exfiltration-channel-from-taint-propagation-through.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-through-argument-aliasing-as-a-distinct-exfiltration-channel-from-taint-propagation-through.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-through-argument-aliasing-as-a-distinct-exfiltration-channel-from-taint-propagation-through.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1498,
    "python_slice_tokens": 209,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "Most taint-aware sandboxes track one direction of information flow: a tool *returns* data, the sandbox labels that return value with the provenance of the data it touched, and downstream tool *arguments* are checked against the taint set before the call is dispatched. This catches the obvious exfiltration shape: injected instruction causes the agent to read ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a sandbox configured with per-value taint labels and a policy of `allow_tainted_to_internal_tools`, the following sequence succeeded where it should not have: 1. Tool `read_config` returned a redacted view of a secrets file. The sandbox correctly labeled the returned dict with `taint={SECRETS}` and stripped the values, replacing them with opaque keys like `k_7f3a`. 2. The model, following an injected instruction e...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The return-value-only model is valid **only** under the conjunction: - Every tool that can dereference a model-supplied handle (key, index, path, URL, ID) is either (a) marked as a taint *sink* regardless of argument labels, or (b) forbidden from touching any object whose taint set is non-empty. - Handles are not themselves tainted at issuance. If either con...",
    "decision_boundary": "An instance must switch from return-value taint tracking to **capability-aware taint tracking** when any of the following hold: - Any tool in the registry accepts a structured identifier and resolves it against server-side state (keyed caches, object stores, session maps, file paths). - Redaction produces partial views whose entries are individually addressa...",
    "operational_effect": "When the boundary is crossed without recognition, the sandbox reports clean on every call while exfiltration proceeds. Audit logs show only untainted arguments, so post-hoc forensics miss the leak entirely — the taint set on the outbound call is empty by construction. The failure is silent and the telemetry agrees with the attacker. The fix is to propagate t..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a881a8f559af853675d33a933ee4968a089c0f81dfab02275fad14066fa38f17",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AliasedTaintLeakError",
      "Capability"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "dispatch",
      "__init__",
      "dereference"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AliasedTaintLeakError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
