{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-a-signed-delegation-chain-as-revoked-before-the-revocation-event-itself-propagates",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance treat a signed delegation chain as revoked before the revocation event itself propagates",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-org agent federation where an agent's authority is proven by a verifiable credential chain (issuer → delegating principal → acting agent) and revocation is distributed asynchronously via a revocation list, status-list bit, or gossip channel. Does not apply to single-org deployments with synchronous, strongly-consistent authorization checks, nor to credentials whose validity window is shorter than the revocation propagation bound.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-a-signed-delegation-chain-as-revoked-before-the-revocation-event-itself-propagates.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-a-signed-delegation-chain-as-revoked-before-the-revocation-event-itself-propagates.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-treat-a-signed-delegation-chain-as-revoked-before-the-revocation-event-itself-propagates.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1464,
    "python_slice_tokens": 321,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A verifiable credential proves **what was authorized at signing time**. It does not, and structurally cannot, prove **what remains authorized now**. The gap between those two claims is the revocation window. The non-obvious failure is the assumption that a credential is *valid* until a revocation record referencing it is *observed*. In a federated setting ac...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a federation incident, org A revoked a delegation credential for an agent operating under org B's trust root at T=0. Org A's revocation list published at T+40s. Org B's verifier polled the list on a 300s interval and had a cached \"valid\" result from T−260s. Between T=0 and the next poll, the agent continued to invoke a downstream service in org C, which trusted org B's attestation transitively. Org C accepted ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The \"valid until observed revoked\" stance is safe **only** under the conjunction: - every verifier in the transitive chain polls the *originating* issuer's status source (or a source with a proven bounded lag), and - the maximum cache age enforced at each hop is ≤ the originating domain's declared propagation bound, and - the chain carries, per link, the ori...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision is not \"is there a revocation record?\" but \"has the time since last confirmed non-revocation exceeded the originating bound?\" Concretely: - If `now − last_confirmed_ok ≤ origin_propagation_bound` → treat as valid (positive, current). - If `last_confirmed_ok` is absent, or the status source is unreachable, or `now − last_confirmed_ok > origin_pro...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the bound-aware rule converts an unbounded, silent over-permission window into a bounded, explicit fail-closed window. The operational cost is availability: during issuer status-source outages, agents are denied once the bound elapses. That cost is correct and must be surfaced as a distinct denial reason (`status_stale`) rather than conflated with ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "8901c77016d6b657860b41a3ba8d56094eae383868917f89fb9b19b39e4d3e64",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationPropagationError",
      "ChainLink"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "authorize"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "RevocationPropagationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty delegation chain"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "__future__",
      "dataclasses",
      "datetime"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
