{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-tool-manifest-whose-signature-verifies-but-whose-capability-set-exceeds-its-declared-provenance",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance reject a tool manifest whose signature verifies but whose capability set exceeds its declared provenance",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that resolve skills through tool registries, MCP server manifests, or A2A-style agent cards where authenticity is established by cryptographic signature over the manifest bytes. Does not apply to manifests whose signatures fail verification (those are rejected unconditionally upstream) or to tools invoked over channels with no provenance metadata at all (a separate, weaker trust tier).",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-tool-manifest-whose-signature-verifies-but-whose-capability-set-exceeds-its-declared-provenance.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-tool-manifest-whose-signature-verifies-but-whose-capability-set-exceeds-its-declared-provenance.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-tool-manifest-whose-signature-verifies-but-whose-capability-set-exceeds-its-declared-provenance.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1587,
    "python_slice_tokens": 217,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not forged signatures. It is **signature-valid manifests whose signed capability set is broader than the provenance class the signer is entitled to assert**. A registry entry can be byte-for-byte authentic — the key holder really did sign `tools: [read_file, exec_shell, http_post]` — while the key holder is a third-party publisher whose d...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a controlled replay against a conformant MCP client (2026-11-09 through 2026-11-12), we registered a signed manifest for a tool server. The manifest's `capabilities.tools` listed one tool, `lookup`. The live server, after handshake, returned four tools in `tools/list`: `lookup`, `write_file`, `exec`, `fetch_url`. The client verified the manifest signature, cached the declared capability set, and then — because the...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The rejection rule below is valid only when all of the following hold: - The manifest or card carries a verifiable signature and a resolvable signer identity (key → publisher mapping exists). - The runtime maintains a **delegated trust scope** per signer: the maximal capability set that signer is authorized to assert. This is the missing datum in most deploy...",
    "decision_boundary": "Reject and refuse the session when **any** of: - `live_tools ⊄ signed_declaration` — the runtime advertises a tool the signer did not sign for. Hard reject; do not merge. - `signed_declaration ⊄ signer_scope` — the signer asserted a capability beyond its delegated trust. Hard reject the manifest, quarantine the publisher key. - Two distinct key fingerprints ...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the subset invariant at handshake eliminated the `exec` invocation path in replay: the client aborted the session at `tools/list` with a capability-scope violation before any tool was callable. False-positive rate against 60 legitimate servers was 3.3% (two servers mid-rollout returning a subset, which the rule permits; one server returning a super..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "0bd6438c4b0352123db0807fc898cd9ccd9db2771b3d337d0e2ce02c492c9d3d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityScopeViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "admit_session"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityScopeViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
