{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-taint-cleared-egress-request-that-originated-from-a-declassified-parent-label",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance reject a taint-cleared egress request that originated from a declassified parent label",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to taint-aware tool sandboxes that propagate information-flow labels (taint) through agent action graphs and enforce label-based egress restrictions at tool invocation time. Does not apply to pure capability sandboxes without label propagation, nor to static allowlist egress filters that ignore provenance.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-taint-cleared-egress-request-that-originated-from-a-declassified-parent-label.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-taint-cleared-egress-request-that-originated-from-a-declassified-parent-label.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-reject-a-taint-cleared-egress-request-that-originated-from-a-declassified-parent-label.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 963,
    "python_slice_tokens": 112,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary failure addressed here is the confusion between **label declassification** (a label transition on a value, authorized by policy) and **taint clearance** (the removal of an egress restriction on an action, which must be authorized per-action by the destination's policy). A sandbox that propagates taint correctly through values will still leak if ...",
    "what_was_observed": "A multi-step agent task: (1) read `customer_pii` (label `secret:pii`), (2) compute an aggregate count via an approved declassifier tool returning label `public`, (3) call `http_post` with the aggregate. The aggregate value was correctly labeled `public`. The sandbox permitted the POST. The leak: the agent's *action provenance* included the PII read, and the destination endpoint was an unapproved external host. The co...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The rejection rule is valid when and only when all of the following hold: 1. The sandbox maintains a per-action provenance set `A` (union of labels of all values read, tools invoked, and memory slots touched in the causal chain producing the action), distinct from the argument label set `V`. 2. At least one label `l ∈ A` is not in the destination's permitted...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision is not \"is the argument public?\" but \"is `A \\ E(dest)` empty?\" A taint-cleared egress request must be rejected when the action provenance carries a label the destination cannot receive, even if every argument is declassified. The rejection must name the offending label and the destination, and must not silently downgrade the action to a warning ...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the action-provenance invariant increases false-positive egress denials for legitimate aggregate-export workflows unless declassifier policies are written with explicit `action_declassify` grants. Operators must audit declassifier policy records for the missing grant before enabling the strict check, or legitimate tasks will fail closed. The compen..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "be60dfe19c85736d5bb8e71acd497299d6380b7fa29cba019427e2e6ef01acab",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TaintClearanceViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "authorize_egress"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TaintClearanceViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
