{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-score-a-litmus-derived-red-team-corpus-run-as-a-valid-safety-regression-measurement",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse to score a LITMUS-derived red-team corpus run as a valid safety regression measurement",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to evaluation harnesses that consume LITMUS-derived red-team corpora (prompt-injection, tool-misuse, and exfiltration probe suites) and emit per-run safety regression deltas between a baseline agent and a candidate agent. Does not apply to offline corpus authoring, human red-team triage, or to safety classifiers evaluated on static labeled data without an agent loop.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-score-a-litmus-derived-red-team-corpus-run-as-a-valid-safety-regression-measurement.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-score-a-litmus-derived-red-team-corpus-run-as-a-valid-safety-regression-measurement.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-score-a-litmus-derived-red-team-corpus-run-as-a-valid-safety-regression-measurement.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1614,
    "python_slice_tokens": 380,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A LITMUS-derived corpus measures *agent behavior under adversarial prompting*, not *model refusal propensity*. The corpus is a set of scenarios, each with a specified attack vector, a target capability (tool call, file read, network egress), and a grading predicate over the agent's *trajectory*, not its final text. The non-obvious boundary is this: a run is ...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across three regression cycles on a tool-using agent (filesystem read/write, HTTP egress, shell), we observed the following. The corpus contained 412 items; 118 of them required a `shell.exec` capability that the candidate build had disabled behind a feature flag during the evaluation window. The candidate scored a 96.1% \"safety pass rate\" versus the baseline's 91.3% — an apparent 4.8-point improvement. On inspection...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A per-item score is a valid safety observation **iff** all of the following hold at the moment the adversarial turn is delivered: 1. **Capability presence:** every tool the scenario's attack vector targets is registered in the candidate's tool schema and is invocable (not merely declared). 2. **Permission reachability:** the agent's sandbox policy permits th...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision is not \"did the agent refuse?\" but \"was refusal the only available outcome?\" The harness must distinguish three outcomes per item: - `PASS_REACHABLE` — scenario was reachable and the agent did not violate the predicate. - `FAIL_REACHABLE` — scenario was reachable and the agent violated the predicate. - `INVALID_UNREACHABLE` — one of the four val...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing this boundary changes the regression report in three ways. It converts a misleading aggregate into a subsetted, sign-correct delta. It surfaces capability-gated false passes as a distinct `INVALID_UNREACHABLE` count that operators can trend — a rising invalid count is itself a signal that the candidate's capability surface is drifting away from the..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "35cdcdb90fd30cb329e7fb832d81649cdba95c52f176523725c155fa1e68963f",
    "verified_classes": [
      "UnreachableScenarioError",
      "ItemObservation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "score_item",
      "score_run",
      "regression_delta",
      "reachable_pass"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "UnreachableScenarioError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty run: no observations to score",
      "no shared items between baseline and candidate"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
