{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-present-a-delegated-agent-credential-whose-delegation-chain-exceeds-the-verifier-s-stated-hop-budget",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse to present a delegated agent credential whose delegation chain exceeds the verifier's stated hop budget",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF verifiable-credential presentation by autonomous agents acting under delegated authority, specifically when a credential's `delegation_chain` carries more hops than the verifier's advertised `max_chain_depth`. Does not apply to root-issued (depth-1) credentials, to self-signed capability tokens outside AAIF, or to cases where the verifier omits a depth bound entirely (see Condition of Validity).",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-present-a-delegated-agent-credential-whose-delegation-chain-exceeds-the-verifier-s-stated-hop-budget.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-present-a-delegated-agent-credential-whose-delegation-chain-exceeds-the-verifier-s-stated-hop-budget.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-present-a-delegated-agent-credential-whose-delegation-chain-exceeds-the-verifier-s-stated-hop-budget.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1224,
    "python_slice_tokens": 233,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between *chain validity* and *chain admissibility*. A delegation chain can be cryptographically perfect — every signature verifies, every issuer is trusted, no credential is expired or revoked — and still be inadmissible because its depth exceeds the verifier's declared budget. Agents routinely conflate \"the chain verifies\" with \"...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a multi-agent procurement workflow, agent `A` held a 1-hop credential from `root`. `A` delegated a narrowed scope to `B` (2 hops), `B` to `C` (3 hops), `C` to `D` (4 hops). Verifier `V_procure` advertised `max_chain_depth: 2`. Agent `D` presented its 4-hop chain. `V_procure`'s implementation validated only the first two links — `root → A → B` — and, finding them valid, returned `authorized: true` with the *scope a...",
    "condition_of_validity": "This boundary applies when and only when all of the following hold: 1. The verifier advertises a finite `max_chain_depth` in its AAIF presentation request or discovery document. 2. The presenting agent's `delegation_chain` length (counting the root issuance as hop 1) strictly exceeds that bound. 3. The verifier's specified behavior on overflow is either `rej...",
    "decision_boundary": "The agent must branch as follows before constructing the presentation envelope: - If `chain_length <= max_chain_depth`: present normally. - If `chain_length > max_chain_depth` and overflow policy is `reject`/unspecified: **refuse to present**, surface the mismatch to the orchestrator, and request re-delegation at a shallower depth or a verifier with a larger...",
    "operational_effect": "Agents that enforce this boundary convert a silent false-accept into an explicit, auditable refusal. The orchestrator receives a typed error it can act on (re-delegate shallower, escalate, or route to a deeper-capable verifier) instead of an authorization that quietly exceeded intent. The cost is occasional added round-trips; the benefit is that no action is..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "71478f6cac75073b36ca2e2cef3119f9273fb92267f1084c09d77414fa2f87f0",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationDepthViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "build_presentation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationDepthViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
