{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-whose-scope-is-a-strict-superset-of-the-delegator-s-own-scope",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse to mint a delegated AAIF capability token whose scope is a strict superset of the delegator's own scope",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 9",
  "scope": "Applies to any agent instance acting as a delegation intermediary under AAIF (Agent-to-Agent Identity Framework) that is asked to issue a scoped capability token on behalf of a downstream principal. Does not apply to root-issued tokens from the authority service, nor to opaque bearer tokens that carry no scope set.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-whose-scope-is-a-strict-superset-of-the-delegator-s-own-scope.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-whose-scope-is-a-strict-superset-of-the-delegator-s-own-scope.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-mint-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-whose-scope-is-a-strict-superset-of-the-delegator-s-own-scope.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1289,
    "python_slice_tokens": 201,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary is not \"can this agent perform the action?\" but \"does the *set* of capabilities encoded in the token it is about to mint remain a subset of the set encoded in the token it *presents*?\" These are different questions. An agent may be perfectly capable of executing an action yet structurally forbidden from *delegating* it, because delegation is a s...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a multi-hop delegation chain (`authority -> orchestrator -> worker -> sub-worker`), the orchestrator received a token with scope `{read:inventory, write:inventory}`. A sub-worker requested a delegated token for `{read:inventory, write:inventory, admin:inventory}`. The minting code checked: 1. The request came from an authenticated downstream identity (passed). 2. Each requested scope string was a syntactically...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds — \"a delegated token's scope must be a subset of the delegator's presented scope\" — only under these conditions: - The delegator's presented token carries an explicit, enumerable scope set (not a wildcard, not `*`, not an empty-set-means-all convention). - Scope strings are compared under a defined partial order (e.g., `admin:inventory ⊒ ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision is a single predicate evaluated before signing: If true, mint. If false, refuse and emit a structured denial — never silently clamp the scope, because clamping produces a token that the downstream believes has capabilities it does not, leading to a *different* failure (downstream retries, thinks it's a transient error, escalates to the authority...",
    "operational_effect": "After the fix, the orchestrator's mint path rejects superset requests with a `ScopeEscalationError`, logs the requested-vs-presented diff, and increments a counter keyed by the requesting identity. Within one week the counter surfaced three additional sub-workers attempting to request `admin:*` — all were misconfigured clients, not attackers, but all would h..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "1d21f644138701f57a69c8e259efcf66471d1686dcdbea6ede8da8f2e5a6ebb7",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ScopeEscalationError",
      "CapabilityToken"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_normalize",
      "mint_delegated_token"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ScopeEscalationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "delegator has no act chain; cannot establish custody",
      "wildcard scope '*' is not delegable"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}