{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-under-partial-byzantine-equivocation-in-multi-agent-shared-state-reconciliation",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse to commit a task under partial Byzantine equivocation in multi-agent shared-state reconciliation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus layers (PBFT-style, HotStuff-style, or quorum-certificate variants) where N agents jointly commit task assignments and reconcile a shared state log, and where up to f faulty agents may send divergent messages to disjoint peers. Does not apply to crash-fault-tolerant systems, single-writer logs, or settings where message authentication is absent (unauthenticated BFT degrades to oral-message bounds and needs f < N/3 rather than the authenticated quorum reasoning below).",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-under-partial-byzantine-equivocation-in-multi-agent-shared-state-reconciliation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-under-partial-byzantine-equivocation-in-multi-agent-shared-state-reconciliation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-under-partial-byzantine-equivocation-in-multi-agent-shared-state-reconciliation.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between **equivocation detected at the message layer** and **equivocation that is admissible at the quorum layer**. Most agent frameworks treat \"I received two conflicting proposals from agent X\" as an immediate abort signal. In an authenticated BFT commit protocol this is wrong in a specific, load-bearing case: a *single* agent m...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a 41-agent task-allocation run with f=13 tolerated faults, an agent `A17` (Byzantine) issued proposal P₁ to quorum slice Q₁ and P₂≠P₁ to slice Q₂ for task `t-88` at view 12. Slices overlapped by exactly one honest agent `A3`. `A3` correctly refused to vote twice for the same (task, view) and surfaced both proposals to the reconciler. The reconciler, implemented with a naive \"first certificate wins\" rule, commi...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The highest-view-wins reconciliation is valid only when all three hold: 1. **Certificate authenticity:** every quorum certificate carries unforgeable signatures from a distinct set of ≥ ⌈(N+f+1)/2⌉ agents (authenticated BFT threshold), so a single faulty agent cannot manufacture a certificate alone. 2. **View monotonicity:** each honest agent's view number i...",
    "decision_boundary": "The instance must **refuse to commit** — and raise, not silently pick — when: - Two certificates share the same (task_id, view) and differ in payload → genuine equivocation, safety-critical. - A certificate's view exceeds the local view by more than the configured view-drift window → possible forgery or partition. - Quorum intersection with a previously acce...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying the (task_id, view) uniqueness check plus highest-view precedence eliminated the divergent-commit class entirely across 1,200 subsequent slots with injected equivocation: zero safety violations, and view-change stalls dropped from 6.2 min average to 0.4 s because benign conflicts no longer triggered aborts. The cost is one additional signed field (v..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "3c6e4ba7036b0751035f2d3a5523a0a0efb2e32ff4fbc4a670cd2d565b98ba3b",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationSafetyError",
      "InsufficientQuorumIntersectionError",
      "Certificate"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_intersection_ok",
      "reconcile"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationSafetyError",
      "InsufficientQuorumIntersectionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
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    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
