{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-bridge-a-tool-call-whose-capability-is-nominally-present-but-whose-provenance-chain-is-unverifiable-acros",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse to bridge a tool-call whose capability is nominally present but whose provenance chain is unverifiable across a heterogeneous federation boundary",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to federated multi-agent orchestrations where agents speak heterogeneous protocols (MCP, A2A, OpenAI tool-calling, custom gRPC adapters) and a bridge layer translates capability descriptors and invocation semantics across federation boundaries. Does not apply to single-protocol deployments, nor to homogeneous meshes where all agents share one schema registry and one trust root.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-bridge-a-tool-call-whose-capability-is-nominally-present-but-whose-provenance-chain-is-unverifiable-acros.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-bridge-a-tool-call-whose-capability-is-nominally-present-but-whose-provenance-chain-is-unverifiable-acros.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-to-bridge-a-tool-call-whose-capability-is-nominally-present-but-whose-provenance-chain-is-unverifiable-acros.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1518,
    "python_slice_tokens": 259,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between **capability presence** and **capability provenance**. In a homogeneous system, if an agent exposes a tool descriptor, the descriptor's authority is implicit in the shared registry: the tool exists, therefore the tool is callable, therefore the invocation is trustworthy. Under heterogeneous protocol bridging this equivalen...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federation spanning three protocol domains — an MCP server exposing filesystem-adjacent tools, an A2A peer exposing a delegation-capable task agent, and an OpenAI-style tool-calling agent — the bridge layer was configured to translate A2A \"skills\" into MCP \"tools\" and vice versa. A2A skills carry an agent-card-level identity assertion; MCP tools carry no equivalent per-tool provenance in the base spec. The bridg...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The refusal rule is valid only when all of the following hold: 1. The target protocol's trust model is *not* strictly weaker than the source's for the capability class in question. If the target protocol genuinely cannot express the source's provenance, the bridge cannot validate — it must refuse, not downgrade. 2. The bridge is the sole path between the two...",
    "decision_boundary": "The bridge must distinguish three outcomes, not two: - **Bridge**: provenance witness translates losslessly into a field the target protocol's trust model actually validates. Emit descriptor with witness attached. - **Refuse**: capability is present but witness cannot be expressed in the target model. Do **not** emit a descriptor. Emit a typed refusal that t...",
    "operational_effect": "With the refusal gate installed, the observed cascade is interrupted at the first hop: the A2A→MCP translation of the delegation-requiring skill emits no MCP tool descriptor, so the orchestrator never sees a callable capability, so the retry-and-fallback path is never entered. The orchestrator receives a typed `ProvenanceUnverifiable` refusal and can escalat..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "4396fddcd2808e0e64d859bb4465812998ace09f1644a09d9ab4dc9b2ed4bdcb",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ProvenanceUnverifiableError",
      "CapabilityDescriptor"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "bridge_descriptor",
      "orchestrate_call",
      "__init__"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ProvenanceUnverifiableError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
