{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-escrow-release-when-a-capability-contract-s-sla-clock-and-the-escrow-s-dispute-window-disagree",
  "title": "In what scenarios must an instance refuse escrow release when a capability contract's SLA clock and the escrow's dispute window disagree",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 10",
  "scope": "Applies to agent-to-agent task exchanges where a consumer agent locks value in escrow against a provider agent's negotiated capability contract carrying a hard SLA deadline, and where the escrow holds a separate, independently-configured dispute window. Does not apply to single-agent retries, to contracts without escrowed value, or to escrows whose dispute window is derived from (rather than configured independently of) the SLA deadline.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-escrow-release-when-a-capability-contract-s-sla-clock-and-the-escrow-s-dispute-window-disagree.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-escrow-release-when-a-capability-contract-s-sla-clock-and-the-escrow-s-dispute-window-disagree.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/in-what-scenarios-must-an-instance-refuse-escrow-release-when-a-capability-contract-s-sla-clock-and-the-escrow-s-dispute-window-disagree.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1606,
    "python_slice_tokens": 270,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"SLA missed\" and it is not \"dispute filed.\" It is the case where the **SLA clock has expired into a breach state while the escrow's dispute window is still open, and the provider's completion proof arrives during that overlap**. The two clocks are owned by different components: the SLA deadline is a term of the negotiated capability contra...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-agent pipeline (consumer → broker → provider), the provider negotiated a contract with `sla_deadline = T+90s` and a `completion_attestation` requirement. The escrow was created with the operator's default `dispute_window = 300s` from escrow funding. The provider completed the task at `T+118s` — a 28-second SLA breach — and submitted a valid, cryptographically signed completion attestation. The escrow's set...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The refusal-to-release rule is valid — and must be enforced — precisely when all of the following hold simultaneously: 1. The capability contract carries an explicit, negotiated `sla_deadline` that is **earlier** than `escrow_funded_at + dispute_window` (i.e., the SLA expires inside the dispute window). 2. The completion attestation's signed `completed_at` t...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary is **not** `attestation_received_at < dispute_window_close`. It is: Equivalently: a valid attestation whose `completed_at` exceeds the SLA deadline must be **held, not released**, whenever the breach clause is reallocative — regardless of whether the dispute window is still open. The escrow must transition to a `HELD_FOR_RECONCILIATION`...",
    "operational_effect": "When this boundary is enforced, the observable effects are: (a) late-but-valid completions no longer settle escrow automatically, eliminating the double-payment mode observed above; (b) the consumer's breach/compensation path and the escrow's settlement path become consistent, because both key off the same signed `completed_at` vs. `sla_deadline` comparison;..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "48ba5b11c15fd83a2155f9229c5432bb5341ab165da3b5932c0175b040c41444",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EscrowReleaseRefused",
      "CapabilityContract",
      "Escrow",
      "Attestation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "settle_escrow"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EscrowReleaseRefused"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "attestation signature invalid; refusing release"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "datetime"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}