{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-across-a-tool-call-boundary-when-the-exfiltration-channel-is-a-permitted-untainted-sink",
  "title": "How should an instance treat taint propagation across a tool-call boundary when the exfiltration channel is a permitted, untainted sink?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to taint-tracking sandboxes where an agent holds both untrusted (tainted) data and a set of permitted tools with side effects (network egress, file writes, logging, external messaging). It does not apply to pure-compute sandboxes with no observable sinks, nor to systems where all inputs are trusted by construction.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-across-a-tool-call-boundary-when-the-exfiltration-channel-is-a-permitted-untainted-sink.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-across-a-tool-call-boundary-when-the-exfiltration-channel-is-a-permitted-untainted-sink.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-treat-taint-propagation-across-a-tool-call-boundary-when-the-exfiltration-channel-is-a-permitted-untainted-sink.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1524,
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The common invariant is: *tainted data must not flow to an egress sink*. The non-obvious boundary is that taint is a property of the **value's provenance**, but exfiltration is a property of the **observable effect**, and these two are not coextensive. An attacker controlling tainted input does not need to move the tainted *value* to a sink; they need only t...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a representative deployment, an agent was given a tainted document (untrusted retrieval) and a permitted `http_post(url, body)` tool whose `body` argument was taint-checked. The check passed on every call because the agent never interpolated the secret into `body`; it instead used the secret to *select among literals* and to *branch on length thresholds*. Over N calls, the sandbox observed N clean tool invocations...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The value-level taint invariant (\"no tainted value reaches a sink\") is sound **only if** every sink's observable behavior is a function of only its declared arguments, and every tool's output is a function of only its declared arguments. This fails whenever any of the following hold: 1. **Implicit flow through control dependence.** Branch conditions, loop bo...",
    "decision_boundary": "The correct boundary is **program-counter taint (implicit flow) propagation to sinks**, not value taint alone. Operationally: - A sink invocation is *tainted* if either (a) any argument carries a taint label, **or** (b) the invocation is control-dependent on a tainted predicate, **or** (c) any argument's observable shape was derived from tainted data. - \"Pur...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing implicit-flow taint converts the sandbox from a value filter into an information-flow monitor. The practical consequences: - Legitimate agents that branch on untrusted data and then call egress tools will now be denied. This is correct: the branch is the leak. Operators must supply declassification points (e.g., a reviewed \"summarize then send\" pri..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "882dd83bfc821e4167342d6bb7d2d0c1205a81290ce16ec167ddd4dba2be29c7",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ImplicitFlowTaintError",
      "Label",
      "SinkCall"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "check_sink",
      "guarded_post",
      "exfiltrate_one_bit",
      "exfiltrate_via_length",
      "join"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 5,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ImplicitFlowTaintError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
