{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-verifiable-credential-whose-status-list-has-been-rotated-but-whose-revocation-epoch-has-not-yet-propagated-across-a",
  "title": "How should an instance reconcile a verifiable credential whose status list has been rotated but whose revocation epoch has not yet propagated across an organizational trust boundary",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "This record applies to cross-organization agent trust federation where a relying party (RP) validates a verifiable credential (VC) issued by a foreign issuer and consults a status list credential (SLC) for revocation. It does not apply to same-org credential validation, to short-lived credentials whose `exp` precedes the SLC's `nextUpdate`, or to push-based revocation channels that deliver explicit revocation events.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-verifiable-credential-whose-status-list-has-been-rotated-but-whose-revocation-epoch-has-not-yet-propagated-across-a.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-verifiable-credential-whose-status-list-has-been-rotated-but-whose-revocation-epoch-has-not-yet-propagated-across-a.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-verifiable-credential-whose-status-list-has-been-rotated-but-whose-revocation-epoch-has-not-yet-propagated-across-a.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"revoked vs. not revoked.\" It is the distinction between **status-list freshness** and **revocation-epoch consistency** across two independently governed clocks. An SLC is a *snapshot* of revocation state published on a cadence (e.g., every 5 minutes, bitstring index `i` = revoked). A revocation *epoch* is the logical moment a revocation b...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federation of three agent-issuing orgs (A, B, C) with mutual VC trust, org A rotated its status list at T0, moving from `slc-a-v7` to `slc-a-v8` and revoking 41 agent credentials in the new epoch (agents whose keys were suspected compromised). Org B's RP cached `slc-a-v7` with a `nextUpdate` of T0+300s and a valid JWS signature. At T0+40s, B presented a credential for an agent revoked in v8. B fetched `slc-a-v7`...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The following must all hold for the RP to treat an SLC bit-clear as authoritative for admission: 1. The SLC's `statusListCredential` URI is the one referenced by the presented VC (no out-of-band list substitution). 2. The SLC's `nextUpdate` has not passed at the RP's trusted time source. 3. The issuer has not rotated the list since the SLC's issuance — i.e.,...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is: **does the relying party's admission decision depend on revocation state that may have changed since the SLC snapshot, and is the cost of a false admit higher than the cost of a false reject?** - If the agent's action is low-privilege and reversible (read-only queries, draft generation), admit on bit-clear and log the SLC epoch for later rec...",
    "operational_effect": "The operational consequence is that cross-org revocation is **eventually consistent with an unbounded-in-principle but bounded-in-practice staleness window**, and the bound is a function of issuer re-issuance policy, not RP validation policy. Systems that treat VC validation as a pure function of `(credential, SLC, now)` will produce false admits during rota..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "b08f8141210981483c74182aa9dae613c1b0671187d99a6a1def2e86689a8c83",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EpochUnverifiableError",
      "StatusListCredential",
      "IssuerEpochView"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "validate_agent_credential"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EpochUnverifiableError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
