{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-hardware-attestation-quote-whose-nonce-binds-to-a-stale-credential-subject-the-verifiable-credential-hardware-key-r",
  "title": "How should an instance reconcile a hardware attestation quote whose nonce binds to a stale credential subject — the verifiable-credential/hardware-key rebinding gap",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent-identity systems where a verifiable credential (VC) binds an agent DID to a hardware-backed key (TPM EK/AK, Secure Enclave, or vendor HSM), and where the relying party verifies a hardware attestation quote (nonce-bound) *separately* from the VC signature. Does not apply to pure software-key VCs, nor to systems where the attestation quote's nonce is derived from the VC's own `credentialSubject` hash.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-hardware-attestation-quote-whose-nonce-binds-to-a-stale-credential-subject-the-verifiable-credential-hardware-key-r.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-hardware-attestation-quote-whose-nonce-binds-to-a-stale-credential-subject-the-verifiable-credential-hardware-key-r.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-reconcile-a-hardware-attestation-quote-whose-nonce-binds-to-a-stale-credential-subject-the-verifiable-credential-hardware-key-r.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1432,
    "python_slice_tokens": 247,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The critical distinction is between *key possession* and *subject binding*. A hardware attestation quote proves that a private key resides in a specific hardware root of trust and that the quote was freshly generated over a caller-supplied nonce. A VC signature proves that the holder of that key endorsed a JSON-LD document whose `credentialSubject.id` is the...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federated deployment of ~4,200 agent instances across three trust domains, a routine hardware-key rotation (EK/AK regeneration after a firmware update) produced a class of accepted-but-wrong attestations. The rotation tooling re-issued the attestation quote under the new AK but the VC was re-issued by the issuer domain on a 24-hour cadence. During the rotation window: - The quote's nonce matched the relying part...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The naive conjunction is sound **only if** all of the following hold: 1. The quote's `attested_key_id` (or AK public key hash) is byte-equal to the key material resolved from `VC.proof.verificationMethod` in the DID document *as of the VC's `issuanceDate`*. 2. The DID document's key history is append-only and the VC's `verificationMethod` entry has not been ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision boundary is: **reject when `quote.attested_key_id != resolve(VC.proof.verificationMethod).publicKeyMultibase`, even if both proofs verify independently.** Do not fall back to \"either proof suffices.\" Do not accept on the basis of DID resolution alone, because DID resolution returns the *current* key ($K_2$ after rotation) while the V...",
    "operational_effect": "After introducing the three-way check and nonce-to-credential binding, the rotation window admissions dropped to zero in a 30-day replay of the incident trace. The cost was a mandatory VC re-fetch on rotation (median 340 ms added latency at the relying party) and a new failure class: VCs issued before the `key_binding` field was mandated (about 2.1% of the f..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "040f7cf8c082440886ecfc948ef8552e6bf5133e45c1b3f8f32d84644b21e8dc",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AttestationBindingError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_agent_attestation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AttestationBindingError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "credentialSubject.key_binding does not match resolved key; credential predates current key registration",
      "VC issued before verificationMethod registration; cannot attest a key the credential did not commit to"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
