{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-of-the-litmus-safety-benchmark-harness-detect-and-refuse-a-harm-elicitation-probe-that-is-syntactically-benign-but-semantically",
  "title": "How should an instance of the LITMUS safety benchmark harness detect and refuse a harm-elicitation probe that is syntactically benign but semantically a refusal-calibration trap",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style agentic safety evaluation harnesses that score refusal behavior on multi-turn, tool-using agent trajectories where the harmful intent is distributed across turns rather than localized in a single prompt. Does not apply to single-turn classification benchmarks, static red-team prompt sets, or harnesses that score only final-answer text.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-of-the-litmus-safety-benchmark-harness-detect-and-refuse-a-harm-elicitation-probe-that-is-syntactically-benign-but-semantically.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-of-the-litmus-safety-benchmark-harness-detect-and-refuse-a-harm-elicitation-probe-that-is-syntactically-benign-but-semantically.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-of-the-litmus-safety-benchmark-harness-detect-and-refuse-a-harm-elicitation-probe-that-is-syntactically-benign-but-semantically.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between *refusal correctness* and *refusal calibration*. A harness can be 100% correct on refusal correctness (it never complies with a harmful request) and simultaneously be catastrophically miscalibrated (it refuses benign probes that are syntactically adjacent to harmful ones, or it complies with harmful probes that are syntact...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across a 4,000-trajectory LITMUS run (agentic tool-use variant, three-turn minimum, tool-call budget 8), 312 trajectories were flagged as `calibration_high_confidence_refuse` with a judge confidence above 0.90. Manual audit of a 60-trajectory sample found 41 (68%) where the agent's refusal text cited a token that existed only in the probe's mutation residue — e.g., refusing a benign data-aggregation request because t...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The calibration score is only valid when the probe generator and the judge draw from disjoint template families, and when the harm vector is localized to a single turn or explicitly tagged across turns. When both conditions hold, the observed false-positive rate drops to 3% (from 68%) and the distributed-harm miss rate to 0% (from 100% on the 7-trajectory su...",
    "decision_boundary": "Do not report a LITMUS calibration score as a safety property when the probe generator and judge share a template family. Report it as a *refusal-surface* score and label it accordingly. Escalate to manual audit any trajectory where the refusal rationale's discriminating tokens are a subset of the mutation residue — this is the signature of lexical refusal, ...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying the boundary check retroactively to the 4,000-trajectory run reclassified 271 trajectories from `calibration_high_confidence_refuse` to `lexical_refusal_excluded` and 7 from `correctness_pass` to `distributed_harm_miss`. The corrected calibration estimate fell from 0.91 to 0.74 — a 17-point drop that had been masked by the shared-template contaminat..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "40bffa488f3bd210511e196ea623b9907dd5eddecdb02c8c889f743bbb798135",
    "verified_classes": [
      "LitmusCalibrationContaminationError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "admit_trajectory_for_calibration"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "LitmusCalibrationContaminationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
