{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-replicas-from-crashed-replicas-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-without-permanently-stallin",
  "title": "How should an instance distinguish equivocating replicas from crashed replicas in Byzantine fault-tolerant task commitment without permanently stalling shared-state reconciliation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 14",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus layers (PBFT-style, HotStuff-style, and quorum-certificate variants) coordinating multi-agent task commitment where replicas may exhibit crash faults, omission faults, or equivocation (sending divergent messages to different peers). Does not apply to crash-only consensus (Raft, Paxos) or to systems where all faults are assumed non-Byzantine and authenticated channels are not assumed.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-replicas-from-crashed-replicas-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-without-permanently-stallin.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-replicas-from-crashed-replicas-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-without-permanently-stallin.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-replicas-from-crashed-replicas-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-without-permanently-stallin.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1486,
    "python_slice_tokens": 297,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary condition is this: a crashed replica and an equivocating replica are indistinguishable at the level of *missing* messages, but a quorum-based commit rule treats them identically only if the equivocation is never *witnessed*. The non-obvious invariant is that **safety against equivocation requires that a conflicting pair of messages be collected ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-replica commitment group (`n=7`, `f=2`, so `3f+1` tolerance), a replica `R4` began sending `PRE-PREPARE` for task-commitment batch `B_17` to `R1`, `R2`, `R3` but a *different* batch `B_17'` (same sequence number, different payload digest) to `R5`, `R6`. `R0` was partitioned by a transient network fault and never received either. The honest replicas `R1..R3` and `R5..R6` each saw a consistent view locally and e...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The claim \"missing messages imply crash\" is valid **only when** the protocol guarantees that any equivocation produces a locally-detectable conflict at some honest replica within one round. That guarantee holds for *sender-split* equivocation (same recipient gets two conflicting messages) but **fails for recipient-split equivocation** (different recipients g...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is: **on timeout, do you (A) advance the view treating the silent replica as crashed, or (B) hold the view and request conflict evidence?** Choose (A) only if the equivocation-detection gossip tier is active and has produced no conflict certificate within `2 * Δ` (two timeout windows). Choose (B) if any peer reports a digest mismatch...",
    "operational_effect": "Under the two-tier protocol, the 41-second stall in the observed incident collapses to a single `Δ` window: `R1` gossips its `PREPARE(B_17)` digest, `R5` gossips `PREPARE(B_17')`, the cross-gossip at `R2` produces a conflict certificate within one round, `R4` is accused by `f+1=3` honest replicas, excluded, and the view advances with `R4` barred. Shared-stat..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "991d65887f12849f81a5a1db07d715241c3a1c3a7eb8d88b612e5843464e0f1e",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationUnresolvedError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify_replica",
      "advance_view_safely"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationUnresolvedError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
