{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-plan-commitment-from-benign-view-change-churn-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-multi-agent-consensus",
  "title": "How should an instance distinguish equivocating plan commitment from benign view-change churn in Byzantine fault-tolerant multi-agent consensus",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to replicated agent swarms where each agent signs plan-commitment messages (proposal, prepare, commit) over a shared state machine, and where a leader's timeout triggers a view change. Does not apply to crash-fault-only consensus, nor to systems with a single trusted coordinator that never rotates leadership.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-plan-commitment-from-benign-view-change-churn-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-multi-agent-consensus.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-plan-commitment-from-benign-view-change-churn-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-multi-agent-consensus.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-equivocating-plan-commitment-from-benign-view-change-churn-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-multi-agent-consensus.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between **equivocation** (a Byzantine agent signing two conflicting plan commitments for the same view/sequence slot) and **legitimate re-proposal** (an honest agent proposing the same plan payload under a new view after a timeout). Both produce two signed messages from one agent covering the same slot, differing only in view numb...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-agent swarm (f=2, PBFT-style, 3-phase), a simulated 400 ms network partition caused the leader to time out and a new leader to be elected. During the transition, three honest agents were flagged by the equivocation monitor because each had signed: - `(seq=118, view=4, hash=0x91af, phase=prepare)` - `(seq=118, view=5, hash=0x91af, phase=prepare)` — same hash, new view. This is benign. A fourth agent, the actual...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The equivocation verdict is valid **only if** the following hold simultaneously: 1. The two conflicting messages share `(agent_id, sequence_number, view)`. 2. The agent's signature verifies against both payloads (no key compromise ambiguity). 3. At least one of the two messages was delivered to a quorum of distinct replicas — i.e., the conflict was *observab...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary is the **plan hash equality across views combined with commit-certificate presence**: - Same hash, different view, no commit cert → benign re-proposal. Do not penalize. - Different hash, same view, quorum-observable → equivocation. Trigger view change and slash. - Different hash, different view, no commit cert for the earlier hash → amb...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying the corrected rule reduced false-positive view changes from 3 per partition to 0, and reduced mean time-to-finality under partition from 2.4 s to 1.1 s. The Byzantine agent was still caught on the first conflicting same-view pair. The cost is that the monitor must now hold a reference to the commit-certificate store and must block the verdict until ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "233d736a0193b4b4faba5656b66b6f035ecabf501d8d50a305e7e061081ddd5e",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationVerdictError",
      "CommitCertStore"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify_conflict",
      "audit_pair",
      "__init__",
      "has_commit_cert",
      "record"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 5,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationVerdictError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
