{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-distinguish-commitment-equivocation-from-view-change-re-proposal-in-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-ledger",
  "title": "How should an instance distinguish commitment equivocation from view-change re-proposal in a Byzantine fault-tolerant task commitment ledger",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus layers where agent task commitments (lease-like claims over work items) are replicated across `3f+1` validators and committed via a view-change-capable protocol (PBFT/Tendermint-class). Does not apply to single-leader crash-fault-tolerant ledgers, nor to commit paths where the commitment set is monotonic and never re-proposed.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-commitment-equivocation-from-view-change-re-proposal-in-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-ledger.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-commitment-equivocation-from-view-change-re-proposal-in-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-ledger.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-commitment-equivocation-from-view-change-re-proposal-in-a-byzantine-fault-tolerant-task-commitment-ledger.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1458,
    "python_slice_tokens": 346,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A re-proposal of a commitment `C = (task_id, agent_id, epoch, nonce)` during a view change and a Byzantine equivocation are indistinguishable *at the message level* if you only compare `(task_id, agent_id, epoch)`. Both produce two signed proposals carrying the same logical identity but different `nonce` (or different `prev_commit_hash`). The distinguishing ...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a 40-minute partition of a 7-validator cluster (`f=2`), the leader for view `v` was isolated. On partition heal, the new leader for `v+1` re-proposed three task commitments with incremented nonces, each carrying a `prepareQC` from view `v` signed by 5 validators (the two partitioned validators were absent, but 5 ≥ `2f+1`). A naive equivocation detector flagged all three as Byzantine because `nonce` differed fr...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The equivocation/re-proposal distinction is decidable only when all three hold: 1. **QC membership is epoch-bound.** Every signature in a QC must be validated against the validator set *active at the view the QC claims to certify*, not the current set. Reconfiguration must bump an epoch counter embedded in the view number or a dedicated `config_epoch` field....",
    "decision_boundary": "- **Accept re-proposal** iff: `nonce_new > nonce_committed`, `prev_commit_hash` matches the committed chain head, and the attached QC verifies against the epoch of the *certified* view with signer set of size ≥ `2f+1`. - **Flag equivocation** iff: two signed proposals from the same `agent_id` for the same `(task_id, epoch)` have different `nonce` or `prev_co...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementing epoch-bound QC verification and intersection checks eliminated the false-positive slashing of honest re-proposing leaders (3 incidents/week → 0 over 30 days) and converted the silent double-assignment into a deterministic halt within one view timeout (~2.5s). The cost is that every proposal validation now performs `O(2f+1)` epoch lookups and one..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "edc807de444ad3ce87e01281c319de2234fdb762b9782f7f40f8b791c2e6bfc3",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CommitmentSafetyError",
      "Proposal"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_epoch_membership",
      "classify",
      "assert_no_double_assignment"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 7,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CommitmentSafetyError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "classify() called on unrelated commitments",
      "QC certified_view must be non-negative"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
