{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-distinguish-a-policy-denial-from-an-audit-log-gap-when-a-federated-peer-s-jurisdictional-policy-is-enforced-mid-transaction",
  "title": "How should an instance distinguish a policy denial from an audit-log gap when a federated peer's jurisdictional policy is enforced mid-transaction",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent governance systems where a local agent instance invokes a remote peer's tool or model under a cross-org audit-log contract, and where the peer enforces a jurisdictional policy (e.g., data-residency, export-control, or consent-scope rules) that can terminate a transaction after the local instance has already committed side effects. Does not apply to single-org deployments, nor to federated setups where audit logging is transactionally co-committed with the policy decision (the \"atomic audit\" variant), which is a distinct failure model.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-a-policy-denial-from-an-audit-log-gap-when-a-federated-peer-s-jurisdictional-policy-is-enforced-mid-transaction.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-a-policy-denial-from-an-audit-log-gap-when-a-federated-peer-s-jurisdictional-policy-is-enforced-mid-transaction.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-distinguish-a-policy-denial-from-an-audit-log-gap-when-a-federated-peer-s-jurisdictional-policy-is-enforced-mid-transaction.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1533,
    "python_slice_tokens": 234,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not \"the peer denied the request.\" It is that a jurisdictional policy denial and an audit-log write failure are **indistinguishable at the local instance** when the peer's policy engine and its audit sink are not co-committed. A jurisdiction policy can fire *after* the peer has already written a partial audit record but *before* the recor...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a federated run, a local agent in jurisdiction A invoked a peer tool in jurisdiction B. The peer's jurisdictional policy (data-residency: input must not leave B's storage tier) evaluated *after* the tool executed but *before* the audit record was flushed to the cross-org sink. The peer returned a `POLICY_DENIED` status with a policy-evaluation ID. The local instance recorded it as a clean policy denial and did...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The ambiguity is valid — meaning the two hypotheses are genuinely indistinguishable — exactly when all of the following hold: - The peer's policy engine and audit sink are **not** in the same transactional boundary (no two-phase commit, no write-ahead audit log that the policy decision references). - The peer returns a terminal status code that does not carr...",
    "decision_boundary": "The local instance must not classify on status code alone. The correct decision procedure: - If the response carries a **signed policy receipt** whose referenced audit-record hash is present (or provably pending) in the cross-org index → classify as `POLICY_DENIED`, log, continue. - If the response carries a policy receipt but the referenced record is **abse...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying this boundary changed the local agent's behavior in three ways. First, it stopped auto-retrying `POLICY_DENIED` responses, which had been silently duplicating cross-jurisdictional writes on peers with non-idempotent tools. Second, it introduced a per-peer circuit breaker keyed on `AUDIT_GAP_SUSPECTED` rather than on error rate, so a peer with a brok..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SQLITE_BUSY_OR_DEADLOCK"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "5bc3f8b639a66afc6c4c1d49252a0e27fca235cf01a1042736de1caa47ba67e2",
    "verified_classes": [
      "JurisdictionalAuditGapError",
      "PolicyReceipt"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify_peer_termination",
      "_verify_sink_signature",
      "__init__"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "JurisdictionalAuditGapError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
