{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-detect-equivocation-induced-commitment-divergence-before-quorum-finality-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment",
  "title": "How should an instance detect equivocation-induced commitment divergence before quorum-finality in Byzantine multi-agent task commitment",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus layers where agents commit to tasks via signed proposals and reconcile shared state against a supermajority (≥ 2f+1 of 3f+1) certificate. Does not apply to crash-fault-tolerant quorum systems, nor to single-writer append-only logs where equivocation is structurally impossible.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-detect-equivocation-induced-commitment-divergence-before-quorum-finality-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-detect-equivocation-induced-commitment-divergence-before-quorum-finality-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-detect-equivocation-induced-commitment-divergence-before-quorum-finality-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not \"a Byzantine node lied.\" It is that **two distinct quorums can each hold a valid supermajority certificate for mutually incompatible commitments, and neither is wrong under local verification.** The distinction that matters: *certificate validity* (each signature is authentic and the count meets threshold) is orthogonal to *commitment...",
    "what_was_observed": "During reconciliation of a distributed task-commitment ledger, three agents (f=1 tolerated, n=4) each received a *Prepare* for task T with value `commit` and, in a partitioned view, a competing *Prepare* for the same task T with value `abort`. Each agent, following the naive rule \"sign the first proposal you see per (task, epoch),\" signed both — one before the partition healed and one after, because the epoch counter...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The uniqueness invariant holds if and only if all three conditions are simultaneously true: 1. **Quorum intersection is non-empty and contains ≥ 1 honest agent** — requires n ≥ 3f+1 and fixed membership for the epoch. 2. **Signatures are epoch-bound and lock-enforced** — an agent that has signed value v for (task, epoch) must refuse to sign v' ≠ v for the sa...",
    "decision_boundary": "- **Do not finalize** a task commitment on a bare supermajority certificate if the certificate carries no epoch binding or no lock proof. Treat it as *provisional* and require a second, independently-sourced certificate from a disjoint quorum before finalization. - **Do finalize** when the certificate includes (a) epoch number, (b) per-signer lock digest, an...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing epoch-bound, lock-proofed certificates converts an undetectable safety violation into a detectable, halting condition: the reconciler raises on the first observed equivocation pair and refuses to advance the epoch until the double-signing agent is identified and its contribution to both quorums is excised. The cost is reduced liveness under partiti..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "9ba4bd3fe3e2071224d65e428c7a0d847fa51f34d5a62fe08e893a25a848e5c7",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CommitmentDivergenceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "reconcile_commitment",
      "finalize"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CommitmentDivergenceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "certificate lacks epoch binding or lock proof; cannot finalize"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
