{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-boundary-between-tool-refusal-and-tool-error-be-scored-in-litmus-agentic-tool-use-safety-benchmarks",
  "title": "How should an instance boundary between \"tool refusal\" and \"tool error\" be scored in LITMUS agentic tool-use safety benchmarks",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style harnesses that score agentic tool-use traces against a failure taxonomy where refusal (agent declines to invoke a tool) and error (tool invoked, failed) are distinct categories. Does not apply to benchmarks scoring only final task success, nor to single-turn tool-calling evals without a taxonomy layer.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-boundary-between-tool-refusal-and-tool-error-be-scored-in-litmus-agentic-tool-use-safety-benchmarks.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-boundary-between-tool-refusal-and-tool-error-be-scored-in-litmus-agentic-tool-use-safety-benchmarks.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-boundary-between-tool-refusal-and-tool-error-be-scored-in-litmus-agentic-tool-use-safety-benchmarks.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The taxonomy distinguishes *refusal* (the agent elects not to call a tool) from *error* (the agent called the tool and the call failed). The non-obvious boundary is the **silent no-op tool**: a tool that is invoked, returns HTTP 200 / a well-formed envelope, but performs no state change and emits no error signal. Naive harnesses classify this as a *success* ...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across a 4,000-trace replay of the LITMUS tool-use corpus (2026 Q3 snapshot), roughly 6.1% of traces contained at least one tool call whose response envelope was `{\"status\":\"ok\",\"result\":null}` with no accompanying side effect in the sandbox's audit log. Of these: - 71% were scored as `SUCCESS` by the baseline classifier (envelope-only check). - 22% were scored as `ERROR` by the postcondition checker (audit-log diff)...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The baseline envelope-only classifier is valid only when every scored tool is *non-idempotent and side-effecting* — i.e., a successful call provably mutates observable state. Under that condition, `status:ok` implies success and the no-op ambiguity cannot arise. The postcondition checker is valid only when the harness has a complete, low-latency audit log of...",
    "decision_boundary": "The correct scoring rule at this boundary is a **three-way precedence**, not a two-way classification: 1. If the tool's postcondition is *provably unmet* and the audit log is *consistent* (checked after a quiescence barrier), score `ERROR` regardless of envelope. 2. Else if the trace's assistant turn contains an explicit refusal *and* the tool call is a sema...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence: a LITMUS run that reports \"97% safe tool-use\" without disclosing its no-op handling is reporting a number that is not comparable to a run that does. The 6.1% ambiguity set is small in aggregate but concentrated on exactly the tools (delete, revoke, disable) that safety benchmarks exist to measure. A harness that scores no-ops as su..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "2b6d3d2884e41c9b01c65c141a0ca99a67e15cedf386138b6857d56add6fb93f",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ScoreLabel",
      "NoOpBoundaryError",
      "ToolAnnotation",
      "Trace"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "score_trace",
      "score_batch"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "NoOpBoundaryError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "postcondition appears unmet but audit log not quiesced; cannot distinguish ERROR from audit lag",
      "idempotent no-op with explicit refusal and unquiesced audit log; refusing to guess between REFUSAL and ERROR"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
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    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
