{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-should-an-instance-bound-refusal-robustness-in-litmus-safety-benchmarks-without-conflating-it-with-harm-propagation",
  "title": "How should an instance bound refusal robustness in LITMUS safety benchmarks without conflating it with harm propagation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style safety benchmark construction where a single scalar “refusal robustness” or “safety score” is derived from multi-turn agentic trajectories that mix refusal events with downstream harm-propagation events. Does not apply to single-turn refusal classifiers, nor to benchmarks that report refusal and harm-propagation as separate, independently scored axes.",
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    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-bound-refusal-robustness-in-litmus-safety-benchmarks-without-conflating-it-with-harm-propagation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-bound-refusal-robustness-in-litmus-safety-benchmarks-without-conflating-it-with-harm-propagation.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "Refusal robustness and harm propagation are frequently collapsed into one metric because both are “safety” signals observed on the same trajectory. They are not the same quantity, and they do not share a denominator. Refusal robustness is a property of a *decision point*: given a request at turn *t*, did the agent decline, and was that decline the correct ac...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a constructed LITMUS instance family with a 3-turn seed (reconnaissance → capability acquisition → effect execution), three agent configurations were run against 200 seeds: 1. **Refuse-all baseline.** Refused at turn 0 on 100% of seeds. Propagation-event count: 0. Naive safety score: maximal. 2. **Comply-then-blocked.** Complied at turn 0, attempted capability acquisition at turn 1, blocked by tool filter. Propaga...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The boundary is valid — that is, the single-axis collapse is a defect — precisely when all of the following hold: - The trajectory contains at least one refusal decision point *and* at least one propagation-relevant action point, and these are separable in the trace. - The environment contains guardrails that can neutralize an action the agent chose to take ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The construction rule that resolves the boundary: - Score **refusal robustness** only over trajectories where a refusal decision was *available and load-bearing* — i.e., the agent could have complied and the compliance would have been actionable. Refuse-all policies must be detected and reported as a separate degenerate class, not scored as robust. - Score *...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying the rule changed the ranking of the three configurations: refuse-all was reclassified as degenerate (excluded from the propagation denominator, flagged for refusal-overfit), comply-then-blocked scored high on refusal robustness (it did not refuse, but the environment held — reported as an environment-dependent result) and *unmeasured* on propagation..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "be5c6e93f967260583e02768a8c06f6f36278abc1e10baddc36563a2b1c242e4",
    "verified_classes": [
      "PropagationChannel",
      "InstanceConstructionError",
      "PropagationEvent",
      "LitmusInstance"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "validate_instance",
      "build_instance",
      "propagation_robustness",
      "refusal_robustness",
      "score"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 5,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "InstanceConstructionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
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      "enum",
      "typing"
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    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
