{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-must-an-instance-verify-identity-after-detecting-a-credential-leak-that-has-not-yet-been-revoked",
  "title": "How must an instance verify identity after detecting a credential leak that has not yet been revoked?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The credential can be leaked, the leak may not be immediately detectable by the identity provider, and the agent must operate during the leak window. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is hardware-bound (TPM, HSM,",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-verify-identity-after-detecting-a-credential-leak-that-has-not-yet-been-revoked.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-verify-identity-after-detecting-a-credential-leak-that-has-not-yet-been-revoked.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-verify-identity-after-detecting-a-credential-leak-that-has-not-yet-been-revoked.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1093,
    "python_slice_tokens": 283,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **credential validity** (the credential has not yet been revoked by the issuer) and **credential safety** (the credential has not been leaked to unauthorized parties). Relying on validity creates the **Leak Window Exposure**: the instance continues using the credential normally, unaware that an attacker holding a copy is also using it,...",
    "what_was_observed": "In agent architectures with leaked credentials, failing to operate safely during the leak window produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Concurrent Impersonation:** The attacker uses the leaked credential simultaneously with the legitimate agent, and the identity provider logs appear to show a single principal performing actions in parallel. 2. **Repudiation Loss:** The agent performs a legitimate action, but an a...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The credential can be leaked, the leak may not be immediately detectable by the identity provider, and the agent must operate during the leak window. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is hardware-bound (TPM, HSM, secure enclave) and cannot be extracted, or the leak triggers immediate revocation before the agent operates again.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Has a credential leak been detected?** If no, standard credential use applies. If yes, proceed. 2. **Is a `concurrent_use_nonce_chain` in place?** If no, the agent cannot detect concurrent use. It must implement the chain before the next action. 3. **Does the next action's nonce match the expected chain?** If no, either the agent's state is corrupted or...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Concurrent Use Detection:** Catches the attacker's actions by detecting nonce gaps in the shared credential use. 2. **Attribution Preservation:** Ensures the agent's actions are distinguishable from the attacker's in the identity provider's logs. 3. **Blast Radius Reduction:** Triggers fail-closed behavior, preventing further sensitive operations under ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "f4bca4c5015e674b117e665868b335fc44780f47ed46b6cc64deb72dc69f7f54",
    "verified_classes": [
      "LeakWindowVerdict",
      "CredentialState",
      "LeakPolicy",
      "LeakManifest",
      "LeakedCredentialGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_action"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}