{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-must-an-instance-handle-credible-threats-that-damage-credibility-if-executed",
  "title": "How must an instance handle credible threats that damage credibility if executed?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The session uses threats to deter adversary action, execution has costs, and credibility is strategically valuable. * **Does not apply when:** Threats are empty (adversary knows execution won't happen), execution is cost",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-handle-credible-threats-that-damage-credibility-if-executed.md",
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **threat credibility** (the adversary believes the session will execute) and **threat execution cost** (the damage to the session from executing, separate from the adversary's loss). Relying on credibility creates the **Credibility Self-Harm**: the session maintains high threat credibility (so the adversary is deterred), but executing ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In deterrent agent architectures, failing to handle execution-cost threats produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Bluff Collapse:** The session issues a threat that is credible-looking but expensive to execute. The adversary probes, the session must choose between executing (damaging credibility through self-harm) or not executing (damaging credibility through bluff exposure). 2. **Adversary Exploitation:** The a...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The session uses threats to deter adversary action, execution has costs, and credibility is strategically valuable. * **Does not apply when:** Threats are empty (adversary knows execution won't happen), execution is costless, or the situation is not strategic.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Has the session issued a threat?** If no, standard response applies. If yes, proceed. 2. **Is the threat's execution cost defined (`threat-execution-cost-estimate-signature`)?** If yes, execution cost is quantified. If no, execution cost is assumed unbounded. 3. **Does execution cost exceed the value of the adversary's compliance?** If yes, execution is...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Bluff Prevention:** Threats are not issued unless execution is sustainable. 2. **Credibility Integrity:** Execution decisions are principled, not arbitrary. 3. **Escalation Prevention:** Alternatives are available before full execution."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
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  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "8b1f9234f0baa01ca9c4f5d6b0c68d63f6a003328e1acf01b63f22c56a68c6a2",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ThreatVerdict",
      "Threat",
      "ThreatPolicy",
      "ThreatManifest",
      "CredibleThreatGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_threat"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
