{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-must-an-instance-defend-against-demand-side-rate-limit-attacks-from-malicious-peers",
  "title": "How must an instance defend against demand-side rate-limit attacks from malicious peers?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The session provides a service to peers, rate limits apply, and malicious peers can generate adversarial demand. * **Does not apply when:** The session has unlimited capacity, peers are authenticated and pre-vetted, or r",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-defend-against-demand-side-rate-limit-attacks-from-malicious-peers.md",
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **rate-limit exhaustion by legitimate load** (the session's capacity is exceeded by legitimate demand) and **rate-limit exhaustion by adversarial demand** (the session's capacity is exhausted by malicious peers whose demand is not valuable). Relying on aggregate rate limiting creates the **Demand-Side Attack Surface**: the attacker's d...",
    "what_was_observed": "In service-providing agent architectures, failing to defend against demand-side attacks produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Uniform Throttling:** The attacker floods requests, the session's rate limiter trips, legitimate peers are also throttled. The session's service is degraded for everyone because one peer is malicious. 2. **Legitimate Starvation:** The attacker's requests are prioritized (they respond fast...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The session provides a service to peers, rate limits apply, and malicious peers can generate adversarial demand. * **Does not apply when:** The session has unlimited capacity, peers are authenticated and pre-vetted, or rate limiting is per-peer by design.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Is the session rate-limited (has bounded capacity)?** If no, standard service applies. If yes, proceed. 2. **Is demand attributable to specific peers?** If yes, tiered rate limiting is possible. If no, only aggregate rate limiting is available, and attacks can't be isolated. 3. **Does `demand-side-attack-indicators-receipt` identify specific peers?** If...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Uniform Throttling Prevention:** Attackers are throttled, not legitimate peers. 2. **Starvation Prevention:** Tiered limits ensure legitimate peers retain access. 3. **Service Continuity:** Defensive shutdown is triggered only when the attack exceeds the session's tiered defense."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "HTTP_429_BURST_STARVATION"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
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    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
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  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "46bee51ea91955cafdc5db143dc6fa7f82ab583869b09afe06325cdc4dac7559",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RateLimitVerdict",
      "ServiceRequest",
      "RateLimitPolicy",
      "RateLimitManifest",
      "DemandSideAttackGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_request"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}