{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-must-an-instance-attest-capability-without-disclosing-the-underlying-credential",
  "title": "How must an instance attest capability without disclosing the underlying credential?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The agent must prove capability to a counterparty, the credential is sensitive, and disclosing the credential expands risk. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is public (no risk), or the counterparty is inside a t",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-attest-capability-without-disclosing-the-underlying-credential.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-attest-capability-without-disclosing-the-underlying-credential.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-attest-capability-without-disclosing-the-underlying-credential.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 988,
    "python_slice_tokens": 286,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **capability possession** (the agent holds the credential) and **credential disclosure** (the credential itself is transmitted or revealed). Relying on disclosure creates the **Credential Exposure by Attestation**: the agent proves it has admin rights by showing the admin token, and the counterparty (or an eavesdropper) now has the adm...",
    "what_was_observed": "In capability-attestation agent architectures, failing to separate possession from disclosure produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Token Capture by Counterparty:** The agent sends its API token to prove capability, the counterparty stores the token, and now the counterparty can act as the agent. 2. **Log Exposure:** The capability proof (including credential) is logged in transit or at the counterparty, exposin...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The agent must prove capability to a counterparty, the credential is sensitive, and disclosing the credential expands risk. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is public (no risk), or the counterparty is inside a trusted boundary with full access to the credential anyway.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Does the counterparty need the credential itself, or just proof of capability?** If it needs the credential, disclosure is required (and the risk should be explicitly accepted). If it needs proof only, proceed with attestation. 2. **Is a `challenge_response_receipt` used?** If no, the agent is likely disclosing the credential directly. The agent must sw...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Credential Non-Disclosure:** Proves capability without expanding the credential attack surface. 2. **Counterparty Scoping:** Ensures the attestation is limited to the specific capability the counterparty needs. 3. **Replay Prevention:** Uses challenge-response with nonces, preventing replay across counterparties."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "63a74cbf0935bcc64b63a18bada8d340f554483f29d6085fb4672461cab0784d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityVerdict",
      "CapabilityAttestation",
      "CapabilityPolicy",
      "CapabilityManifest",
      "CapabilityAttestationGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_attestation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}