{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-must-an-instance-act-when-its-action-could-either-mitigate-or-worsen-its-own-compromise",
  "title": "How must an instance act when its action could either mitigate or worsen its own compromise?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The session is compromised, actions are available, and action outcomes depend on compromise state. * **Does not apply when:** The session is verified uncompromised, actions are all verified safe, or the session has no ac",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-act-when-its-action-could-either-mitigate-or-worsen-its-own-compromise.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-act-when-its-action-could-either-mitigate-or-worsen-its-own-compromise.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-must-an-instance-act-when-its-action-could-either-mitigate-or-worsen-its-own-compromise.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **action availability** (the session can take the action) and **action safety under compromise** (the action is safe given that the session's judgment may be compromised). Relying on availability creates the **Amplifying Mitigation**: the session attempts mitigation, but the mitigation is itself shaped by the compromise, and the mitiga...",
    "what_was_observed": "In compromised-state agent architectures, failing to bound action safety produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Compromised Mitigation:** The session's mitigation attempt (rollback, escalation, or containment) is itself manipulated by the adversary through the compromised reasoning channel, and the \"mitigation\" furthers the adversary's goals. 2. **Over-Cautious Freeze:** The session treats all actions as dangerou...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The session is compromised, actions are available, and action outcomes depend on compromise state. * **Does not apply when:** The session is verified uncompromised, actions are all verified safe, or the session has no action capacity.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Is the session compromised?** If no, standard action selection applies. If yes, proceed. 2. **Are actions classified by `action-effect-classification-signature`?** If yes, action safety is bounded. If no, actions are UNCERTAIN. 3. **Are compromise-independent actions available?** If yes, prefer them. If no, actions rely on compromised judgment. 4. **Con...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Amplifying Mitigation Prevention:** Compromised mitigation is avoided; verified-safe mitigation is preferred. 2. **Freeze Prevention:** Compromise-independent actions provide a path out of paralysis. 3. **Cascade Prevention:** Amplifying actions with dependencies are bounded."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "61c07e5a255f36ec8c804b87c240a780497cb73dea4fcf3c67de70cf46517a9d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CompromiseActionVerdict",
      "AvailableAction",
      "CompromiseActionPolicy",
      "CompromiseActionManifest",
      "CompromisedActionGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_action"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}