{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocation-in-a-heterogeneous-llm-agent-bft-quorum-when-the-equivocating-node-is-also-its-own-most-confident-witness",
  "title": "How does an instance detect equivocation in a heterogeneous LLM-agent BFT quorum when the equivocating node is also its own most confident witness",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to replicated state machines whose replicas are LLM agents (possibly of differing model families, temperatures, and tool access) running a BFT consensus protocol (PBFT, HotStuff, Tendermint-style) where message equivocation is possible. Does not apply to homogeneous deterministic replicas, nor to quorums where a trusted external verifier signs and orders all messages.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocation-in-a-heterogeneous-llm-agent-bft-quorum-when-the-equivocating-node-is-also-its-own-most-confident-witness.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocation-in-a-heterogeneous-llm-agent-bft-quorum-when-the-equivocating-node-is-also-its-own-most-confident-witness.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocation-in-a-heterogeneous-llm-agent-bft-quorum-when-the-equivocating-node-is-also-its-own-most-confident-witness.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1998,
    "python_slice_tokens": 426,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not \"a Byzantine agent sends conflicting messages.\" That is the textbook case, and PBFT's view-change and commit-certificate machinery handles it. The non-obvious boundary is this: **an LLM agent can equivocate against itself without lying**, because its \"signature\" over a proposal is a sampled generation, not a deterministic function of ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-replica HotStuff-style quorum (5f+1 = 7, f=2) with agents drawn from four model families, we observed the following during a 40-hour soak with injected prompt-level adversarial instructions on two replicas and default sampling (temperature 0.7, top-p 0.95) on all replicas: 1. Replica R3 (honest, high-temperature) produced value `v_a` for view 112, sequence 9, and — on a retry triggered by a slow leader — produ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The boundary holds — i.e., the protocol's equivocation detection is *sound but not sufficient* — under the conjunction: - **Heterogeneity:** replicas differ in model family, decoding parameters, or tool access such that two calls to the same replica on the same input are not deterministic. - **Sampling nondeterminism:** at least one replica has temperature >...",
    "decision_boundary": "An instance should treat a detected equivocation as **Byzantine (expel)** rather than **stochastic (quarantine)** if and only if at least one of the following is verifiable: - The two divergent payloads are *inconsistent under the application's own invariant* (e.g., one double-spends, one violates a monotonic counter) — this is malicious or corrupt, not samp...",
    "operational_effect": "The operational consequence is a **reduced effective Byzantine budget**. A quorum sized for f Byzantine replicas, of which k are honest-but-stochastic, has an *effective* Byzantine budget of f + k for value safety, because a stochastic replica can produce two values that both pass signature verification and both attract honest corroborators. If f + k > f, th..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "1d1352970ffb759ecc9ca15e44adabab6b5b7433593220c7d138ed390707640b",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationClass",
      "EquivocationBudgetError",
      "SignedProposal"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify_equivocation",
      "recompute_effective_budget",
      "handle_detected_equivocation",
      "envelope_key"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationBudgetError",
      "ValueError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "proposals are not an equivocation pair"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
