{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocating-leaders-when-quorum-certificates-are-valid-but-disjoint",
  "title": "How does an instance detect equivocating leaders when quorum certificates are valid but disjoint?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus deployments (PBFT-derived, HotStuff/Tendermint-style, and DAG-based variants) where a replica must detect a leader that has produced two conflicting but individually well-signed proposals, each accompanied by a valid quorum certificate (QC). Does not apply to single-leader crash-fault systems, nor to protocols that embed an explicit equivocation-proof gossip layer at proposal time.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocating-leaders-when-quorum-certificates-are-valid-but-disjoint.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocating-leaders-when-quorum-certificates-are-valid-but-disjoint.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-equivocating-leaders-when-quorum-certificates-are-valid-but-disjoint.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1709,
    "python_slice_tokens": 406,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A quorum certificate attests that *some* supermajority signed a specific block hash. It does **not** attest that this supermajority is the *only* supermajority that could sign a conflicting hash, nor that the signers of QC-A and QC-B are the same set. In a system with $n = 3f + 1$ replicas, any two quorums of size $2f+1$ intersect in at least $f+1$ replicas ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-replica ($f=2$) HotStuff-style deployment during a leader-failover stress test, a Byzantine leader at view $v$ produced block $B_1$ and block $B_2$ (both extending the same parent, conflicting payloads). It sent $B_1$ to replicas $\\{0,1,2,3\\}$ and $B_2$ to replicas $\\{3,4,5,6\\}$. Replica 3 (honest) received both but, per its vote-once-per-view rule, voted only for the first it saw ($B_1$). The leader then forg...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant \"a valid QC implies no conflicting block can later be certified\" holds **only if** the following are all true: 1. Every honest replica enforces a strict *one-vote-per-view* rule keyed on the view number, and the vote is bound to the block hash (not just the view). 2. The QC's signer bitmap is transmitted and verified alongside the aggregate sig...",
    "decision_boundary": "A replica must transition from *accept* to *reject-and-report* on a QC exactly when it can construct an **equivocation witness**: two QCs $Q_1, Q_2$ with $Q_1.\\text{view} = Q_2.\\text{view}$, $Q_1.\\text{hash} \\neq Q_2.\\text{hash}$, and $|Q_1.\\text{signers} \\cap Q_2.\\text{signers}| \\geq 1$ where the intersecting signer is provably honest (i.e., not the leader ...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that **commit finality must be gated on equivocation-witness absence, not merely on QC validity.** In the observed incident, adding a 200ms \"QC quarantine\" window during which a replica holds a received QC uncommitted while soliciting any conflicting QC for the same view from peers eliminated the divergence: replica 0 received QC..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "23f439c57d160d37be740dc0f3d68c4460c9866ace490a2284840465975ec16a",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationWitnessError",
      "QuarantineViolationError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "evaluate_qc_pair",
      "commit_qc"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationWitnessError",
      "QuarantineViolationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
