{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-agent-identity-when-the-revocation-event-and-the-credential-rotation-race-across-a-federation-trust-boundary",
  "title": "How does an instance detect a revoked agent identity when the revocation event and the credential rotation race across a federation trust boundary",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent-to-agent authentication where a relying party (RP) validates short-lived credentials (≤15 min TTL) issued by a home identity provider (IdP) and revocation is propagated out-of-band via a revocation feed or push. Does not apply to single-domain deployments where the IdP and RP share a revocation store, nor to long-lived bearer tokens validated by online introspection on every call.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-agent-identity-when-the-revocation-event-and-the-credential-rotation-race-across-a-federation-trust-boundary.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-agent-identity-when-the-revocation-event-and-the-credential-rotation-race-across-a-federation-trust-boundary.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-agent-identity-when-the-revocation-event-and-the-credential-rotation-race-across-a-federation-trust-boundary.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1528,
    "python_slice_tokens": 226,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not \"revocation is delayed.\" It is that **revocation and rotation are two independent clocks that can interleave such that a freshly rotated credential is valid-looking, signature-valid, unexpired, and yet belongs to an identity that was revoked before the rotation occurred.** The RP sees a credential whose `iat` (issued-at) is *after* th...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-party federation (IdP-A authoritative, IdP-B replica issuer, RP-C validator) with 10-minute credential TTL and a 90-second revocation propagation SLO: - Agent `agt-7f3` was revoked at IdP-A at `T=0`. The revocation record carried `revoked_at = T+0`. - IdP-B had not yet received the revocation push (propagation lag measured at 47s, within SLO). - At `T+12s`, the agent presented its still-valid credential to...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The \"compare `iat` to `revoked_at`\" heuristic is only sound when **all three** hold: 1. **Single issuer clock.** All credentials for an identity are issued by the same IdP instance that records revocation, so `iat` and `revoked_at` share a monotonic clock. 2. **Revocation-before-issuance ordering is enforced at the issuer.** The issuer refuses to rotate any ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The correct decision rule at the RP is **not** \"accept if `iat > revoked_at`.\" It is: - Maintain a **revocation epoch** per identity, not a single timestamp. The epoch is a monotonically increasing counter signed by the authoritative IdP and incremented on every revocation *and* every un-revocation. - Every credential embeds the `revocation_epoch` it was iss...",
    "operational_effect": "After migrating RP-C to epoch-based validation, the `agt-7f3` replay was rejected at `T=47s` (when the epoch feed arrived) rather than accepted until `T=612s`. The cost: a ~47-second window (the propagation SLO) during which a revoked-but-rotated agent can still act, because the RP cannot know the new epoch until the feed arrives. This window is irreducible ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "5ba267d9a17b4f5b28e3c5fb894629efadf9fbe49d4d3a15a89403297f9f24ee",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationRaceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "validate_credential"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "RevocationRaceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "credential expired",
      "replica-issued credential with unknown revocation epoch; cannot order issuance vs revocation",
      "credential older than propagation window with no epoch record",
      "replica issuer claims post-revocation epoch but is not authoritative; rotation may have raced the revocation feed"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
