{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-aaif-verifiable-credential-when-the-revocation-list-is-unreachable-at-the-exact-moment-of-delegation",
  "title": "How does an instance detect a revoked AAIF verifiable credential when the revocation list is unreachable at the exact moment of delegation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 11",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF credential verification performed by an autonomous agent instance acting as a *delegate* (i.e., presenting or relying on a verifiable credential issued to another agent identity), where revocation status is checked via a pull-based revocation list or status-list endpoint. Does not apply to push-based OCSP-style stapling, nor to credentials whose `credentialStatus` uses a proof-of-non-revocation accumulator shipped inside the credential itself.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-aaif-verifiable-credential-when-the-revocation-list-is-unreachable-at-the-exact-moment-of-delegation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-aaif-verifiable-credential-when-the-revocation-list-is-unreachable-at-the-exact-moment-of-delegation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-aaif-verifiable-credential-when-the-revocation-list-is-unreachable-at-the-exact-moment-of-delegation.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1509,
    "python_slice_tokens": 267,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"revocation check failed.\" The failure is a **tri-state collapse**: AAIF verification semantics define three outcomes for a credential's status — `VALID`, `REVOKED`, and `UNKNOWN` — but most agent runtimes implement the check as a boolean (`revoked?`). When the revocation endpoint is unreachable, a boolean implementation returns `false` (n...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a multi-agent procurement pipeline, a coordinator agent (`did:aaif:coord-7f2`) delegated a `purchase.commit` capability to a worker instance with a 900-second credential TTL. At T+412s the credential's issuer was revoked for a compromised signing key. The worker's status-list fetch to the issuer's `statusListEndpoint` returned `503` for 47 consecutive seconds (the issuer's own revocation publication was mid-redepl...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The distinction is only operationally meaningful under these conditions, and the instance must check all of them before treating an unreachable status endpoint as benign: 1. The credential carries a `credentialStatus` of type `AAIFStatusList2021` (pull-based), not an embedded non-revocation proof. 2. The instance is acting in a **delegation** or **authority-...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary between \"proceed\" and \"halt\" is not the reachability of the endpoint. It is the **age of the last signed status observation relative to the freshness window**, combined with the authority class of the capability. - `last_observation_age < freshness_window` → proceed, regardless of current endpoint reachability. The instance has positive evidence...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementing the tri-state check converts a class of silent authorization grants into explicit halts. In the procurement pipeline, after the fix, the worker halted at T+412s with `CredentialStatusIndeterminateError`, the coordinator retried delegation against a healthy issuer, and the two orders were never placed. The cost was a 47-second stall in a non-crit..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a3673cb8f0d1ce93d38fba5fe4e664b9c4752804959ae7826977f68b17e8e68c",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CredentialStatusIndeterminateError",
      "Status",
      "StatusObservation",
      "CapabilityClass"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "check_delegated_credential"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CredentialStatusIndeterminateError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}