{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-a2a-agent-card-when-the-revocation-propagates-faster-than-the-card-signature-verification-cache",
  "title": "How does an instance detect a revoked A2A agent card when the revocation propagates faster than the card signature verification cache?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-organization A2A (Agent-to-Agent) deployments where an agent card is signed by a home-org key and verified by a relying-party (RP) instance that caches signature-verification results. Does not apply to same-org intra-tenant calls, nor to deployments where the card is re-fetched and re-verified on every request (no cache).",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-a2a-agent-card-when-the-revocation-propagates-faster-than-the-card-signature-verification-cache.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-a2a-agent-card-when-the-revocation-propagates-faster-than-the-card-signature-verification-cache.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-revoked-a2a-agent-card-when-the-revocation-propagates-faster-than-the-card-signature-verification-cache.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1810,
    "python_slice_tokens": 434,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The non-obvious boundary is between **signature validity** and **authorization validity at time of use**. A signed agent card can be cryptographically valid (the signature verifies against the published key, the key is not expired, the card's `expires` field is in the future) while the card is *operationally revoked* — the home org has withdrawn the agent's ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a two-org federation (Org A issues agent cards, Org B relies on them), Org A publishes a signed revocation list at a well-known endpoint with a `next_update` field and a monotonically increasing `sequence`. Org B's gateway caches `verify(card) -> True` for 300 s to avoid an Ed25519 verify plus a JWKS fetch per request. A compromised agent in Org A was revoked. Org A published revocation list sequence `N+1` within ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The cached-verification shortcut is only sound when **all** of the following hold: 1. The revocation list's `next_update` is strictly earlier than the card cache's expiry for every cached entry, *or* the cache is invalidated on every revocation-list sequence bump. 2. Revocation entries are keyed by a identifier present in the request path (the `kid` or the c...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary is **not** \"is the signature valid.\" It is: > Given a request bearing `kid = K` at wall-clock time `t`, is there a signed revocation entry for the card whose `kid == K`, with `revocation.effective_at <= t`, from a revocation list whose signature verifies and whose `sequence` is the highest seen? The operational rule that follows: **sign...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementing the boundary correctly changes the hot path from one cached boolean lookup to: (a) a cached signature verification keyed by `kid`, plus (b) a revocation-list membership check keyed by `kid` against a list refreshed on `sequence` change. The revocation list is small (revocations are rare relative to issuances), so the membership check is a set lo..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "dff8e209c1cf578ba22d500cbaf3dfd9af2093892fe67f178ac15fa8c216b9a7",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationStateIndeterminate",
      "RevocationList",
      "CachedVerification",
      "RelyingPartyTrustGate"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "__init__",
      "_signature_ok",
      "_revocation_fresh",
      "authorize_cross_org"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "RevocationStateIndeterminate"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "assert self._revocation is not None"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "__future__",
      "dataclasses",
      "time",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
