{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "how-does-an-instance-detect-a-cross-issuer-delegation-chain-that-is-individually-valid-but-collectively-unverifiable-at-the-point-of-scope-attenuation",
  "title": "How does an instance detect a cross-issuer delegation chain that is individually valid but collectively unverifiable at the point of scope attenuation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF-conformant agent identity attestation where an acting agent presents a delegation chain of two or more hops, each hop carrying a scope set that is a (possibly equal) subset of its parent, and where the issuers of the hops are not all the same trust anchor. Does not apply to single-issuer, single-hop bearer tokens, nor to chains where every hop shares one issuer and one signing key set.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-cross-issuer-delegation-chain-that-is-individually-valid-but-collectively-unverifiable-at-the-point-of-scope-attenuation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-cross-issuer-delegation-chain-that-is-individually-valid-but-collectively-unverifiable-at-the-point-of-scope-attenuation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-does-an-instance-detect-a-cross-issuer-delegation-chain-that-is-individually-valid-but-collectively-unverifiable-at-the-point-of-scope-attenuation.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1539,
    "python_slice_tokens": 180,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not \"invalid signature\" and not \"expired credential.\" It is the distinction between *per-hop validity* and *chain-level verifiability*. Each hop in a delegated authorization chain can be locally valid: the signature verifies against the issuer's published key set, the `aud` matches the immediate downstream party, the `exp` is in the futur...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a multi-tenant deployment, an orchestrator agent (issuer `orch.example`, root of trust for the tenant) issued a delegation to a workflow agent (issuer `wf.example`) with scope `{read:dataset, write:reports}`. The workflow agent re-delegated to a reporting sub-agent (issuer `rep.example`) with scope `{read:dataset}`. Every hop verified in isolation. The sub-agent's scope was a strict subset of its parent. Signature...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The chain is verifiable only if, at verification time, the verifier can reconstruct the *effective root grant* — the scope set the trust root actually recorded for the first-hop intermediary — and confirm that the terminal scope is a subset of it, independent of what any intermediate hop claims its own grant to be. This requires one of: 1. The root grant is ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is crossed at the moment an intermediate issuer applies any transformation to its scope before re-delegating — normalization, alias expansion, case folding, wildcard materialization, or scope-name remapping. Before transformation, adjacent-hop subset checks are a sound proxy for root containment. After transformation, they are not, because the t...",
    "operational_effect": "Instances that verify pairwise accept chains that silently escalate scope through intermediate normalization. The escalation is not visible in any single hop and does not trip signature, audience, or expiry checks. The observable effect is a terminal agent holding a scope the root never granted, with a verification log that shows all-green per-hop results. D..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "36eaa70e92626e300d5776cda84a50c975da397defe2a7e2ce73211a20e6f96c",
    "verified_classes": [
      "UnanchoredDelegationError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_chain"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "UnanchoredDelegationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "no root-anchored effective grant available; chain is only pairwise valid"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
